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INTRODUCTION 
The problem is in this business that you don’t own your 
product.  If you record, it’s the record company that owns it; if you 
play at a club, it’s the nightclub owners who charge people to 
listen to you, and then they tell you your music is not catching 
on. . . .  This has been my greatest problem—being shortchanged 
because I’m a Negro, not because I can’t produce.  Here I am 
being used as a Negro who can play jazz, and all the people I 
recorded for and worked for act as if they own me and my product.  
They have been guilty of making me believe I shouldn’t have the 
profits from my product simply because they own the channels of 
production. . . .  They act like I owe them something for letting me 
express myself with my music, like the artist is supposed to suffer 
and not to live in clean, comfortable situations. . . .  The insanity of 
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living in America is that ownership is really strength.  It’s who 
owns who’s strongest in America. . . .  That’s why it’s so hard to 
lend your music to that kind of existence. 
—Ornette Coleman1 
The problem that jazz great Ornette Coleman describes in the 
above quote from the 1960s reflects a continuing legal problem 
that has received scant attention in the academic literature: music 
copyright law has done very little to empower or incentivize 
musical authors.  In fact, its rules have traditionally favored non-
author intermediaries.  Since music was first covered by copyright 
in 1831, only composers held ownership rights in their music while 
publishers could be assigned a substantial share.2  After the 
introduction of the phonograph and radio, record companies 
controlled the remainder of rights in composition.3  Sound 
recordings, which were not even protected by copyright until 
1972,4 are typically assigned contractually to the record label by 
the artist.5  And rights in musical performance have always been 
secondary, though performance remains the means by which most 
musicians are compensated for their talents.6  Thus, Coleman’s 
 
 1 A.B. SPELLMAN, FOUR LIVES IN THE BEBOP BUSINESS 129–31 (1966). 
 2 See Charles W. Joiner, Analysis, Criticism, Comparison and Suggested Corrections 
of the Copyright Law of the United States Relative to Mechanical Reproduction of Music, 
2 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 45–47 (1939). 
 3 Id. at 46–47. 
 4 See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended at 
17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 5, 19, 20, 26, 101 (2006)). 
 5 Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights in Sound Recordings, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 375, 377 (2002). 
 6 See Music on the Internet: Is There an Upside to Downloading? Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 14 (2000) [hereinafter Music on the Internet] 
(“In all cases the publicity generated by having recordings available and promoted on 
radio, created an audience for my live performances.  My performing work is how I make 
my living.  Even though I’ve recorded over twenty-five records, I cannot support my 
family on record royalties alone.” (statement of Roger McGuinn, founder of the Byrds)); 
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New 
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 308–09 (2002) (“For the artist, 
free music is a complementary good that increases ticket sales.”); John Perry Barlow, The 
Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/ 
economy.ideas_pr.html (“We [the Grateful Dead] have been letting people tape our 
concerts since the early seventies, but instead of reducing the demand for our product, we 
are now the largest concert draw in America, a fact that is at least in part attributable to 
the popularity generated by those tapes.”); Janis Ian, The Internet Debacle—An Alternate 
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lament is a historic and contemporary sentiment, whose factual 
predicates contradict most of what we understand about the 
rationale and substance of copyright law.  That understanding may 
be a result of failing adequately to consider music copyright from 
the music author’s perspective and to see that perspective 
embodied in not one but two copyright interests, utility and 
personality. 
This Article attempts to do both, for the sake of a better 
understanding of what the revolution in digital music means for 
copyright reform.  Radical changes in the production, consumption 
and compensation of music and musicians have altered many of 
the assumptions on which music copyright ownership is based.  
The traditional roles of intermediaries are threatened, while many 
more music authors now possess the means to be independent.  
From the consumer’s perspective, we are approaching a digital 
commons in which music, because of its reduced costs and easy 
transferability, is analogized to information.7  Information, goes 
the digital age mantra, “wants to be free.”8  As a consequence, 
legal scholars have offered a range of copyright law reforms that 
seek to balance the often competing interests of artists, 
intermediaries, and consumers.  Inherent in most of these reform 
proposals are assumptions about authorship that revolve around a 
need for just compensation.  This economic emphasis is consistent 
with a century-old trend in copyright jurisprudence.  Grounded in a 
larger critique about the unchecked expansion of copyright 
 
View, PERFORMING SONGWRITER, May 2002, available at http://www.janisian.com/ 
article-internet_debacle.html (“Again, from personal experience: in 37 years as a 
recording artist, I’ve created 25+ albums for major labels, and I’ve never once received a 
royalty check that didn’t show I owed them money.  So I make the bulk of my living 
from live touring, playing for 80–1500 people a night, doing my own show.”). 
 7 See Music on the Internet, supra note 6, at 16 (“[Online file-sharing] simply 
facilitates communication among people interested in music.  It is a return to the original 
information-sharing approach of the Internet, and it allows for a depth and a scale of 
information that is truly revolutionary.” (statement of Hank Barry, CEO of Napster)). 
 8 See, e.g., Charles Warner, Information Wants to Be Free, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 
20, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-warner/information-wants-tobef_b_876 
49.html. But see Music on the Internet, supra note 6, at 11 (“‘Information does not want 
to be free.  Only the transmission of information wants to be free.’” (statement of Lars 
Ulrich (quoting Edward Rothstein))). 
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ownership,9 it supports the conclusion reached by many reformers 
that traditional copyright may no longer be the best protector of 
music authors’ rights. 
I argue for greater skepticism about the value to authors of a 
more limited copyright regime.  Critical to the argument are 
normative considerations of who music authors should be, what 
interests copyright law should protect, and what copyright law 
under previous technologies and industry practices has done 
historically to compromise the interests of music authors.  
American music very quickly replaced the ideal of the Romantic 
author with the reality of the non-author copyright owner.  At the 
same time, copyright doctrine relinquished its emphasis on natural 
rights, or rights in authorial personality,10 in favor of a narrower 
interest in compensating authors for the utilitarian benefit they 
bring the rest of us:11 more music.  The utilitarian rationale for 
ownership served non-author business intermediaries well, as we 
will see, but not musicians.  In fact, the move from dual interests, 
utility and personality, to a single interest, economic utility, 
facilitated systematic harms against authorship that may only be 
understood as interests in personality.  These are the general harms 
to which Ornette Coleman refers as an author but not an owner. 
What is an interest in personality?  As I discuss in Part II, 
personality has its roots in the early copyright notion of the 
Romantic author in which a grant of exclusivity for invention was 
justified as rewarding the investment of self.12  In this regard, 
personality reflects a Hegelian construction of labor.13  But this 
 
 9 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 873, 895–904 (1997); see also White v. Samsung Elec. Am. Inc., 989 F.2d 
1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).   In general, I have no quarrel with 
the thrust of this scholarship and have offered my own critique of expansion in the 
trademark and publicity rights context. See generally David Dante Troutt, A Portrait of 
the Trademark as a Black Man: Intellectual Property, Commodification and 
Redescription, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141 (2005). 
 10 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author Stories:” Narrative’s Implications for Moral 
Rights and Copyrights’ Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (2001) 
[hereinafter Kwall, “Author Stories”]. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See id. at 19. 
 13 See Peter Halewood, Law’s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal 
Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331, 1338 (1996). 
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elusive idea of personhood in the work is probably more, I argue.  
An author’s personality interest is known also by the product of its 
loss.  That loss is not merely economic—though it may often have 
economic implications—but is reflected in the diminished capacity 
for control, message, performance and interaction with present and 
future audiences.  Some legal interests, like the dignitary interest in 
torts, are better understood in the negative, by the character of the 
harms to them.  For copyright’s personality interest we may call 
them appropriative harms. 
Nowhere are the appropriative harms to personality more 
manifest than in the history of black musical authorship in the 
United States, and many of those developments are described in 
Part III.  Black artists have often been the canaries in the copyright 
coalmine.  The history of appropriative harms I describe is divided 
between the genres developed before and during the 1909 
Copyright Act14 and those that followed passage of the 1976 Act.15  
The first demonstrates how in “soul music”—spirituals, minstrelsy, 
jazz, rhythm and blues and rock and roll—black authorship was 
expropriated by law and business entities on many levels, 
including the fraudulent divestiture of credit and compensation and 
through the usurpation of style and mimicry.16  Many of these 
common practices directly contradicted or exploited basic 
copyright doctrine, such as the originality requirement17 and the 
idea/expression dichotomy.18  This treatment, chronicled almost 
exclusively by Professor K.J. Greene19 who has likened it to share-
cropping, is important also for the creative responses it engendered 
from black artists.  In almost every instance, we see the tendency 
 
 14 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976). 
 15 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 93-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 
17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810, 1101 (2006)). 
 16 See K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal 
Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 372–73 (1999) [hereinafter Greene, 
Copyright, Culture & Black Music]. 
 17 See id. at 380. 
 18 See id. at 349–51. 
 19 Id. at 349–53; K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the 
Debate over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1197 
(2008) [hereinafter Greene, “Copynorms”]; see also Keith Aoki, Distributive and 
Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special Reference to Coercion, 
Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 722 (2007). 
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to approach discrimination and appropriation with what might be 
called “innovative escape,” ingeniously developing new genres and 
styles after being dispossessed of earlier ones. 
In Part IV, the history continues through the 1976 Act to show 
that many of the practices used against black music authors had 
become institutionalized in the record industry, including 
assumptions about the value and distribution of rights in copyright 
ownership.  Ironically, § 106 of the revised Act more explicitly 
divides (and makes divisible) the bundle of rights to which 
copyright holders are entitled,20 suggesting that different kinds of 
infringements—say, of the right of reproduction versus the right of 
adaptation—may result in different kinds of harms.  Yet all harms 
continue to be understood in only economic terms.  While 
conglomeration occurred among the major record labels in the 
1990s,21 technology eventually provided a vehicle for artist 
independence, if not resistance, to many common industry norms.  
Specifically, in the case of hip-hop music, the rise of entrepreneurs 
who both sampled other artists freely (and, for a while, cheaply) 
and built their own record companies proved a harbinger of the 
independence now commonly seen among music authors and 
artists in the digital era.22  Artist independence may indicate as 
much about authorial personality as it does freedom from onerous 
business terms. 
 
 20 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976) (“The five fundamental rights that the bill 
gives to copyright owners—the exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, 
performance, and display—are stated generally in section 106.  These exclusive rights, 
which comprise the so-called ‘bundle of rights’ that is a copyright, are cumulative and 
may overlap in some cases.  Each of the five enumerated rights may be subdivided 
indefinitely and, as discussed below in connection with section 201, each subdivision of 
an exclusive right may be owned and enforced separately.”). 
 21 See DAVID J. PARK, CONGLOMERATE ROCK: THE MUSIC INDUSTRY’S QUEST TO 
DIVIDE MUSIC AND CONQUER WALLETS 24 (2007).  
 22 See, e.g., Kenneth M. Achenbach, Comment, Grey Area: How Recent Developments 
in Digital Music Production Have Necessitated the Reexamination of Compulsory 
Licensing for Sample-Based Works, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 187, 205–06 (2004) (“For 
example, Russell Simmons, the founder and CEO of Phat Fashions 96 and co-founder of 
Def Jam Records, began his business career as an undergraduate student at City College 
of New York in the mid-1970s when he became the manager of the seminal hip-hop 
group Run-DMC.  Without the capital he drew from sample-based music, Mr. Simmons 
could not have established himself in the music industry and built his multi-million dollar 
business empire.”); see also infra notes 312–13, 316–18 and accompanying text. 
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The contours of those developments and how they interact with 
personality is the subject of Part V.  There I review radical changes 
in the production and dissemination of recorded music that have 
the potential to produce a “pure” system from an artist’s 
perspective—that is, one in which control, compensation, and 
ownership may remain in the artist.  To illustrate a music author’s 
perspective on those changes, I use the experience of a real, now-
independent singer-songwriter, Citizen Cope.23  Although Citizen 
Cope does not happen to be a black musical author, his experience 
as a twenty-first century author and performer is relevant to both 
the history of artists under copyright and their future.  Finally, I 
compare Citizen Cope’s goals and interests to copyright law 
reform proposals offered by Raymond Ku, William Fisher, Jessica 
Litman, and Lawrence Lessig and reach a somewhat ironic 
conclusion.  All offer significant improvements to the current 
system of copyright as it affects consumers, a robust public domain 
and, to a lesser extent, artist compensation.  However, I conclude 
that, as a result of industry changes wrought by digital technology, 
music authors who are protective of personality interests may be 
equally content with the status quo. 
I. THEORETICAL CONCEPTIONS OF COPYRIGHT AUTHORSHIP AND 
ARTISTIC PERSONALITY 
Although early conceptions of copyright justified the grant of 
exclusive rights to a Romantic author on natural law and utilitarian 
grounds, courts were at least mindful of an underlying interest in 
personality that copyright law should protect.  The next section 
analyzes that philosophical tradition, followed by an examination 
of the kind of authorship it privileged.  The Part concludes with a 
discussion of how more Hegelian notions of personhood were 
reflected in early case law, and how, from the perspective of 
black—if not most—musicians, such notions are needed now.  
Those notions amount to a resuscitation of the author’s personality 
interest, defined here primarily by the nature of the harms inflicted 
upon it. 
 
 23 The reader may find more information about Citizen Cope at Citizen Cope, 
www.CitizenCope.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). 
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A. Labor, Utility and the Economic “Author” 
Before purely economic analysis conquered intellectual 
property law, the natural law justification for protection began with 
the assertion that an author has an inherent right in the fruits of her 
labor.24  John Locke’s familiar labor theory of property 
modernized the Roman framework, at least in England, and held 
that, out of a state of nature where resources are held in common, 
individuals convert goods into private property through their 
labor.25  Under most interpretations, private property is an 
individual’s reward for the value that her labor adds to goods; such 
productive activity becomes a benefit to society as a whole.26  The 
theory is subject to the proviso that within the commons there are 
enough and as good materials to go around, and that one’s 
accumulation is conditioned upon not wasting them.27  Whatever 
the basis for applying Locke’s theory to the acquisition of physical 
property today, there is little doubting its applicability to 
intellectual property—provided we agree that the production of 
ideas requires labor of some kind.28 
Alfred Yen’s study of the early development of copyright law 
in England demonstrates how the first copyright act, the Statute of 
Anne of 1710, was motivated by both natural law and pure 
economic considerations.29  While English courts subsequently 
rejected the natural law basis for copyright,30 American 
legislatures did not, in some cases explicitly writing both bases 
into state statutes between 1783 and 1786.31  These acts are 
interesting, as Professor Yen points out, because of the clear link 
 
 24 See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 522–24 (1990). 
 25 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
Hackett Publ’g 1980) (1690). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. § 37. 
 28 See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 1.03 
(2008). 
 29 See Yen, supra note 24, at 526.  Although the statute, entitled “An Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning,” secured copyright terms for authors as economic incentives 
to publish, it clearly benefited powerful printing interests as well. Id. at 525–26. 
 30 See id. at 528. 
 31 Id. at 528–29. 
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they make between a concern for rewarding the labor of authorial 
genius, on the one hand, and the utilitarian interest in promoting 
social welfare through the production of creative works and 
inventions, on the other.32  The preamble to Connecticut’s 
copyright act, entitled “An Act for the Encouragement of 
Literature and Genius,” illustrates the connection: 
Whereas it is perfectly agreeable to the Principles of 
natural Equity and Justice, that every Author should 
be secured in receiving the Profits that may arise 
from the Sale of his Works, and such Security may 
encourage Men of Learning and Genius to publish 
their Writings; which may do Honour to their 
Country, and Service to Mankind.33 
Thus, early copyright law enshrined two primary grounds for 
legal protection: the economic reward to the author, and the 
public’s benefit in artistic innovations.  However, the law would 
develop subsequently to transform the first into an instrumental 
predicate for the second, so that the economic reward to the author 
provided the necessary incentive to produce artistic innovations for 
the public’s benefit.34 
 
 32 See id. 
 33 1783 Conn. Pub. Acts 617; see also An Act to Promote Literature, ch. 54, 1786 N.Y. 
Laws 99.  North Carolina made the link even more explicit: 
Whereas Nothing is more strictly a Man’s own than the Fruit of his 
Study, and it is proper that Men should be encouraged to pursue 
useful Knowledge by the Hope of Reward; and as the Security of 
literary Property must greatly tend to encourage Genius, to promote 
useful Discoveries and to the general Extension of Arts and 
Commerce . . . . 
An Act for Securing Literary Property, ch. 26, 1785 N.C. Sess. Laws 563. 
 34 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“It 
may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be used by others 
without compensation. . . .  [H]owever, this is not ‘some unforeseen byproduct of a 
statutory scheme.’  It is, rather, ‘the essence of copyright.’” (internal citation omitted)); 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is to 
be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of 
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”); Fox Film 
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the 
primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the 
public from the labors of authors.”).. 
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Anchoring the early copyright scheme was the construction of 
the author in Romantic terms.35  As the Connecticut statute 
suggests, the status of an author was conceptualized as a gifted, 
autonomous person capable of producing works that, if not original 
genius, were merely inspired by others.36  The antithesis of the 
author deserving of a copyright monopoly was the plagiarist who 
appropriated the work of others as his own.37  This aspirational 
ideal of a lone author, expressing his genius on paper or canvas in 
a candlelit study or studio, served to justify the extension of a time-
limited economic monopoly in the work to only a qualified few.38 
However, the adoption of a narrowly drawn author within a 
protection regime bent toward economic benefit would necessarily 
prefer certain authors and certain types of authorship over others.39  
These we see illustrated in several foundational copyright 
doctrines.  First, the originality requirement by its terms excludes 
musical compositions that are shown to be borrowed or too directly 
derivative of others.40  While this may seem like an obvious 
constraint on protection, it clearly disfavors works created within 
openly intertextual or synchretic genres where authors freely 
acknowledge that their work flows from folk or other traditions 
 
 35 See Kwall, “Authors Stories,” supra note 10, at 19–21. 
 36 See id. at 21. 
 37 Kembrew McLeod has observed that “[p]rint culture resulted in attempts to close 
down intertextuality by emphasizing Romantic notions of ‘originality’ and ‘creativity,’ 
and at this time there came into being the notion that words can be privately owned.”  
KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP, OWNERSHIP, AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 72 (2001).  This led to a notion of the work as subject to 
commodification, which of course had implications for the meaning of ownership. Id.  
Law would regulate that. Id.  “The thread that ties these concepts together is copyright 
law, and plagiarism provides the deeply resonating moral underpinnings for this 
economically grounded legal construction.” Id. 
 38 Not surprisingly, seminal cases addressing the issue of copyrightability repeatedly 
struggle at the bottom with the question of the deserving author. See, e.g., Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252–53 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(“The clause of the Constitution giving Congress power to promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited terms to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective works and discoveries, does not, as I think, embrace a 
mere advertisement of a circus.”). 
 39 See Kwall, “Authors Stories,” supra note 10, at 19–21. 
 40 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, 
Copyright, and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 571–73 (2006). 
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that discourage credit-taking.41  Second, the idea/expression 
dichotomy, together with the long absence of standalone rights in 
musical performance, excludes from ownership non-composers as 
well as composers who do not write down their work in musical 
notation.42  Third, the formalities of registration and maintenance 
of copyright that were not abandoned until the 1976 Act favored 
literate musical authors with the personal means or external 
resources to secure formal ownership of their work while 
disfavoring the great many musicians who did not.43  Finally, the 
principle of the autonomous work embedded in the Romantic 
author ideal discounted the efforts of authors of joint and collective 
works.44  These and other doctrinal rules would disproportionately 
affect African-American artists, as Professor K.J. Greene has 
convincingly argued.45  The historical analysis will show how 
these rules would provide multiple avenues for expropriation by 
non-author intermediaries who, primarily motivated by economic 
gain, would structure the artist-distributor relationship around 
adhesion and a dispossession of ownership.46  The point for now is 
that the move from natural rights to economic incentives facilitated 
such inequitable arrangements. 
Another consequence of drawing the author concept narrowly 
is the ease with which she may be characterized as an economic 
actor.  As she responds efficiently to economic incentives, her 
identity as an artist recedes.  Modern copyright case law is 
dominated not just by concern for the economic interplay in 
ownership rights, but also by a conception of the author as 
responsive to financial incentives in ways no different than other 
market participants.47  She is a producer of “public goods.”48  
 
 41 See MCLEOD, supra note 37, at 73–77. 
 42 See, e.g., Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 377–80. 
 43 See id. at 353–54. 
 44 See Kwall, “Authors Stories,” supra note 10, at 5. 
 45 See generally Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16. 
 46 See infra Part II.B. 
 47 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The 
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (citation omitted)); accord Fox Film Corp. v. 
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the primary 
object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the 
public from the labors of authors.”). 
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Legal commentators, even very thoughtful legal commentators, 
often view the return for her labor in stark business terms, much as 
a manufacturer, a stockbroker, or a small business person views 
her labor.49  What makes much of the analysis resonate is the fact 
that the modern copyright author-rights holder is in fact a business 
person.  Indeed, in the case of music, the author is probably a 
corporation, such as a record company.  But that does not negate 
the existence of an artist-author behind the initial creation of the 
musical work.  It simply converts her legally and figuratively into 
an employee of the record label.50  Thus, the gradual erosion of the 
Romantic author ideal in favor of an economic actor restricted the 
range of authorial identity.  Ironically, it also made it easier to 
attack the current expansion of copyright ownership rights once 
that “author” became a very powerful and expansive economic 
actor. 
A corollary to expansive economic actors as authors is that 
creative authors may be easily reduced to the status of employees 
with no ownership rights to respect, and worse, easily exploited 
“talent” without the business sophistication to demand better or the 
leverage to resist aggressive business behavior.51  As we see in Part 
II, black artists in particular were denied both of the chief virtues 
of the copyrights holder, receiving neither the economic benefits of 
authorship nor the credit for and control of their work.52  In sum, 
under a utilitarian variation of the Romantic author, the artist’s 
 
 48 See Ku, supra note 6, at 277 (“Public goods are generally defined by two traits.  
First, once produced, they are virtually inexhaustible.  This means that it is possible at no 
cost for additional persons to enjoy the same unit of a public good.  Second, it is difficult 
to prevent people from enjoying the good.” (citation omitted)). 
 49 See, e.g., id. at 305–08 (arguing that music creation now costs relatively little and 
that because musicians make most of their money outside of copyright, ownership rights 
are no longer relevant). 
 50 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903) (noting that 
the material in question could be copyrighted by the employer because it had “been 
produced by persons employed and paid by the [employer] in [the employer’s] 
establishment to make those very things”); see also Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 
809 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing Bleistein as the origin for the work-for- 
hire doctrine). 
 51 See Julie Katzman, Note, Joint Authorship of Commissioned Works, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 867, 875–81 (1989) (noting that the work-for-hire doctrine may be especially 
inefficient regarding commissioned work). 
 52 See infra Part II. 
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investment of creativity has been too easily discounted and 
unprotected. 
B. Authorial Personality 
What is missing might be called authorial personality—
whatever that is.  We are slow to recognize an interest in 
personality in part because it is hard to determine its contents or its 
scope.  The challenge is particularly difficult for law.  A few courts 
and a great many commentators have suggested that our utilitarian 
justification for intellectual property rights—especially aesthetic 
works capable of copyright protection, such as most music—
protect something like authorial personality.53  The most quoted 
judicial acknowledgment comes from Justice Holmes in Bleistein 
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,54 who is explicit in his 
conclusion that, beyond recognition, what gets protection in an 
original work of authorship is personality: 
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual 
upon nature. Personality always contains something 
unique. It expresses its singularity even in 
handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it 
something irreducible, which is one man’s alone. 
That something he may copyright unless there is a 
restriction in the words of the act.55 
Other courts (though few of them recent) have almost 
suggested as much.56  In these conceptions, personality is special 
 
 53 See e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection 
of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1938 (1990) (stating that copyrights 
should only be sought to “safeguard personal goodwill” when a work shows “authorial 
personality”); Stephen P. Tarolli, Comment, The Future of Information Commerce Under 
Contemporary Contract and Copyright Principles, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1639, 1642–43 
(“The prevailing judicial interpretation of modern U.S. copyright law fails to guarantee 
protection to works of information and other utilitarian works of high labor but low 
creative authorship.  The law would be more true to its historical origins if it recognized a 
binary approach to copyright protection that: (1) protects the author’s expression in high 
authorship works, and (2) protects the author’s commercial investment in low authorship 
or utilitarian works.”). 
 54 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
 55 Id. at 250. 
 56 See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 
1951) (“No large measure of novelty is necessary.”). 
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but not necessarily good, unique for being the only one of its kind, 
ordinary yet mysteriously capable.57  The threshold is well below 
genius or gifted—in trademark terms, perhaps merely distinctive.58 
Most commentators who have argued for greater recognition of 
authorial personality ultimately conclude that U.S. copyright law 
should adopt some version of moral rights,59 as most European 
countries have.60  Moral rights protect attribution and integrity.61  
Roberta Kwall, for instance, argues that U.S. copyright’s 
abandonment of the artist’s intrinsic, non-economic motivations to 
innovate was unnecessary.62  Recognizing the “intrinsic dimension 
of creativity” was possible alongside utilitarian justifications,63 she 
emphasizes that “the prevailing law and policies deemphasize the 
intrinsic process of creation in favor of a narrative favoring 
dissemination, commodification, and economic reward.”64  
Ultimately, she argues in favor of moral rights. 
Similarly, Doris Long argues for adopting some version of 
moral rights—especially of disclosure and integrity—in light of the 
increasing lack of authorial control.65  Forgotten by economic 
 
 57 Id. at 102. 
 58 See Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (stating that “Marks are 
often classified in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness; . . . they may be (1) 
generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful.” (citations omitted)). 
 59 See, e.g., Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 390–91; 
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 290–303 
(1988); Kwall, “Authors Stories,” supra note 37, at 5; Doris Estelle Long, Dissonant 
Harmonization: Limitations on “Cash N’ Carry” Creativity, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1163, 
1204–05 (2007). 
 60 See generally Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221; see 
also Kimberly Y.W. Holst, A Case of Bad Credit?: The United States and the Protection 
of Moral Rights in Intellectual Property Law, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105, 105 (2006) 
(“All countries that are party to the Berne Convention are required to provide a minimum 
level of protection for moral rights.”). 
 61 See NIMMER, supra note 28, § 8D.02(C) (noting incorporation into the Berne 
Convention).  Generally speaking, attribution is the right of the author to be correctly 
identified as the author of a work. Id. § 8D.03.  Integrity is the author’s right to prohibit 
objectionable uses or derogations of the work. Id. § 8D.04. 
 62 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of 
the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1949 (2006). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 1983. 
 65 Long, supra note 59, at 1193. 
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analyses and rejected by post-structuralism, creativity has been 
devalued: “The importance of authorship has been questioned; 
creativity has been largely disconnected from it; and any authorial 
control under copyright is rapidly devolving into a ‘cash n’ carry’ 
compensatory right, reducing the relationship between authorship, 
copyright, and control to little more than an economic right of 
compensation.”66 
Whether a musician’s personality resides in matters of control, 
attribution, or other aspects of integrity such that moral rights are 
the appropriate remedy is complicated by a fuller discussion of 
financial dynamics in the next Part.67  Nevertheless, these 
observations strengthen the overarching argument that more 
recognition is both needed and possible even within the existing 
theoretical framework for intellectual property protection.  
Musicians themselves know personality when they feel it.  As the 
following account from the early recording era shows, authorial 
personality expresses something unmistakable about the self, 
which can then be combined and communicated with others: 
When they recorded, the musicians were astounded 
to hear themselves on disk, disembodied and 
unadorned.  In 1925, Hoagy Carmichael and his 
Indiana friends made their first recording, and “tears 
came to our eyes as we listened to it.  Tears of 
affection for each other, tears at the imagined 
beauty of our playing.  Every note an individual 
thing; a part of the man who played it and that man 
a friend”—but now every note was apart from the 
man, and that disembodiment helped to inspire the 
strong emotion.  When Eddie Condon and others 
heard their first disks in 1928, they knew that their 
experiences had been translated into oddly 
satisfying new artifacts.  “The nights and years of 
playing in cellars and saloons and ballrooms, of 
practicing separately and together, of listening to 
Louis and Joe Oliver and Jimmy Noone and Leon 
 
 66 Id. at 1167 (footnotes omitted). 
 67 See infra Part I.C. 
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Rappolo, of losing sleep and breathing bad air and 
drinking licorice gin, paid off. . . . We had never 
been an audience for ourselves. . . .  At the finish, 
we were all laughing and pounding each other on 
the back.”68 
This mysterious capacity to have the hours of one’s life known 
in the work reflects a more Hegelian view of property rights, as I 
discuss next. 
C. The Hegelian Turn and the Author’s Personhood 
From Hegel, we get a clear articulation of a personality 
justification for intellectual property and an acknowledgment of 
the unique character of creation that goes beyond the establishment 
of exclusive rights incident to the mere execution of labor.  Under 
Hegel, property provides an avenue for self-actualization,69 or, as 
Margaret Radin wrote, enriched “personhood.”70  It accomplishes 
this through the individual’s investment and expression of 
personality.  “Personality,” according to Hegel, “is that which acts 
to overcome this restriction and to give itself reality, or in other 
words to claim that other world as its own.”71  Property rights in 
one’s work, therefore, are partially justified as the manifestation of 
one’s personality72 and “the first existence of freedom.”73  A 
personality justification is particularly suited to the copyright of 
aesthetic works.74 
But if intellectual property embodies so much of an author’s 
personality, how would Hegel justify its free alienability?  The 
 
 68 BURTON W. PERETTI, THE CREATION OF JAZZ: MUSIC, RACE, AND CULTURE IN URBAN 
AMERICA 153 (1992) (citations omitted); see also ROLAND GELATT, THE FABULOUS 
PHONOGRAPH 1877–1977, at 213–24 (2d rev. ed. 1977); PAUL OLIVER, SONGSTERS AND 
SAINTS: VOCAL TRADITIONS ON RACE RECORDS 2–3 (1984). 
 69 See Hughes, supra note 59, at 333. See generally Hegel, infra note 71. 
 70 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 37–40 (1996). 
 71 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶ 39 
(T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1945) (1821). 
 72 Id. ¶ 51. 
 73 Id. ¶ 45. 
 74 Copyrights in aesthetic works are also well-suited to a labor theory.  While a labor 
theory may justify granting protection to all, if not most, categories of intellectual 
property, personality may not. See Hughes, supra note 59, at 339–40. 
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answer lay in the belief that alienation involves the externalization 
of the author’s self to be shared and absorbed by other selves.75  
The sharing for payment constitutes an important recognition of 
that author’s personhood.76  Should the form of sharing matter—
say, selling copies versus selling ownership?  Probably somewhat, 
since the latter may also constitute an abandonment.  But 
increasingly the chief benefit of ownership is exchange through 
licensing, which provides authors with control over ever 
broadening means to reach audiences.  Thus, Hegelian personality 
considerations point us back toward the utilitarian rationale: Artists 
must be compensated as authors for the expressions of their 
personality.  Exchange by itself does no harm.  Exploitation and 
appropriation do harm—at least equal to infringement harm—
because they negate the potential for freedom and deny both of the 
interests that copyright law should protect, utility and personality.77  
The remaining question is, what is the personality interest? 
D. The Musician’s Personality Interest and Appropriative Harm 
You’ve taken my blues and gone— 
 
 75 HEGEL, supra note 71, ¶ 71. 
 76 Id.; Hughes, supra note 59, at 349. This gives rise to a paradox of alienation, 
according to Professor Justin Hughes.  Hegel believed that recognition of personhood 
occurred in the alienation of a work’s copies but not through sale (i.e., abandonment) of 
the whole.  Hughes suggested that Hegel’s personality theory is a better justification for 
protection than for exchange. Hughes, supra note 59, at 345.  He describes it as follows: 
The present owner maintains ownership because he identifies the 
property as an expression of his self. Alienation is the denial of this 
personal link to an object. But if the personal link does not exist—if 
the object does not express or manifest part of the individual’s 
personality—there is no foundation for property rights over the object 
by which the “owner” may determine the object’s future.  An owner’s 
present desire to alienate a piece of property is connected to the 
recognition that the property either is not or soon will not be an 
expression of himself.  Thus, the justification for property is missing.  
This subtle control of the object’s future does not jibe with foreseen 
future denial of the personality stake. 
Id. 
 77 See Hughes, supra note 59, at 290–303. But see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural 
Rights: Hegel and Intellectual Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV 453, 453–54 (2006) (“Hegel 
is often cited by personality theorists, but almost always incorrectly. . . .  The personality 
theory of property that dominates American intellectual property scholarship is imbued 
by a Romanticism that is completely antithetic to Hegel’s project.”). 
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You sing ’em on Broadway 
And you sing ’em in Hollywood Bowl, 
And you mixed ’em up with symphonies 
And you fixed ’em 
So they don’t sound like me. 
Yep, you done taken my blues and gone.78 
In the introduction, I suggested that copyright law’s bundle of 
rights to the rights holder is so extensive that it clearly indicates a 
recognition that multiple kinds of harms may be inflicted, not all of 
them economic nor always easy to pinpoint.  In Part I.A, I argued 
that the origins of copyright law reveal a recognition that the 
interests protected by copyright law are not exclusively economic, 
even though modern courts have treated them as such.79  In Part 
I.B–C, I argued that a personality interest should be elevated 
alongside a strictly utilitarian or economic interest.80  The question 
now is, what is that interest?  The answer is that we often know an 
interest by the harms to it. 
Tort law is full of examples of this.  The dignitary interest, for 
instance, is known mainly by the harm of offense to dignity, which 
we assume occurs when a personal space is intentionally invaded81 
 
 78 LANGSTON HUGHES, Note on Commercial Theater, in POETRY FOR YOUNG PEOPLE 34 
(Sterling Publ’g Co. 1994).  
 79 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206–07 (2003) (noting that in addition to 
international concerns, Congress passed the CTEA in light of demographic, economic, 
and technological  changes, and rationally credited projections that longer terms would 
encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their 
works); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) 
(“The Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.  By 
establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the 
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 
(1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by 
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”). 
 80 See supra Part I.B. 
 81 See, e.g., Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967) 
(“Personal indignity is the essence of an action for battery; and consequently the 
defendant is liable not only for contacts which do actual harm, but also for those which 
are offensive and insulting.”).  
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or a peace to which we are entitled is intentionally disrupted.82  
Reputational harm at common law assumed that a serious affront 
to sensibility would inevitably occur as a result of certain words 
spoken.83  All of these examples have a character of appropriative 
harm, and appropriative harm is at the essence of the harm inflicted 
on a music author’s personality interest when aspects of the bundle 
of copyright rights are infringed. 
Similarly, the law of racial discrimination is replete with 
negative definitions of personal interests.  When Kenneth Karst, 
analyzing civil rights law in the context of the Brown v. Board of 
Education84 decision, attempted to define harm in positive terms, 
he referred to it as the frustrated desire for belonging and the right 
to inclusion under law that accompanies citizenship.85  But his 
analysis was clearer when he described the negation of that interest 
as stigma.86  Stigma, he explained, is certainly psychic harm to the 
personality, but it often manifests itself in economic disadvantage 
as well.87  It is a product of the loss, the non-static result of the 
taking.88 
We may therefore understand a music author’s personality 
interest in her creative work by the special loss she experiences 
from its expropriation.  In this conception, the content of the 
personality interest may be more clearly understood through the 
loss of the thing (and the loss of control of the thing) than by the 
thing itself.  Put another way, the measure of what is gained by 
copyright ownership is what is not lost to coerced control, 
unauthorized adaptation or infringement.  The loss of selfhood 
through the theft of one’s creation inflicts an incalculable kind of 
harm.  As the Langston Hughes poem above suggests and like the 
Ornette Coleman statement earlier,89 the harm of loss represents 
 
 82 See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 292 (Cal. 1952). 
 83 See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (stating that the common law 
against slander was designed to address society’s “pervasive and strong interest in 
preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation”). 
 84 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 85 See KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 15–27 (Yale 1989). 
 86 See id. at 25–27. 
 87 See id. at 26–27. 
 88 See id. at 25–27. 
 89 See supra text accompanying notes 1 and 78. 
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something profound about the relationship between authorship and 
ownership that copyright can and should recognize.90  That 
recognition goes beyond the remedial question of whether 
monetary compensation for theft is enough.  Based on a review of 
past wrongs to artists, it supports the present-day conclusion that 
limiting or abolishing copyright is one of the worst things we could 
do to music authors. 
This somewhat simple, rather vague idea, will get more 
contour in the next Part when I explore the various ways the 
development of the modern recording industry model used 
copyright law to reproduce personality injury to black music 
authors.  For now, however, it is important to consider two 
contemporary implications of recognizing personality in 
appropriative harm, the “information analogy” and wealth. 
By the information analogy, I refer to the increasingly 
commonplace statement that music is information or, more 
accurately, that because of the technology that brings us digital 
music downloads, music is a lot like other information that may be 
digitized and easily downloaded.91  What often follows from this 
characterization of music is the assertion that “information wants 
to be free.”92  There are several flaws in this analogy.  The primary 
flaw is that it originates from a music consumer’s perspective, not 
an author’s, and that it is utterly dependent upon advanced 
technology for its truth.93  In a world of only live music, for 
instance, calling music another form of information would make 
 
 90 Indeed, it is profound enough to lament in poetry and other very personal, non-
monetizable expressions of loss. 
 91 Michael Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came to View Musical 
Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405, 1406–07 (2004) (“Some 
declare that ‘information wants to be free’ and that music, like all other forms of digitized 
cultural expression, no longer can be or should be treated as proprietary information.”); 
see RONALD S. ROSEN, MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT 152–59 (2008) (discussing, inter alia, 
Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Cal. 1937)). 
 92 Carroll, supra note 91, at 1406–07. 
 93 See Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries 
of Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 56 n.154 (2004) (“The author cites 
attempts to curb reverse engineering and parodying as two prime examples of 
overreaching which put copyright owners in a bad light. . . .   End users and consumers, 
on the other hand, overreach when claiming that information ‘wants to be free’ and that 
they should therefore be allowed to freely share movies across peer-to-peer networks.”). 
C01_TROUTT_3-9-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2010  1:04 PM 
394 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:373 
little sense.  The deeper problem with the analogy is its 
corresponding conclusion that music must therefore cost little or 
nothing to obtain.94  If we imagine the music author’s ownership 
interest in strictly economic terms, we struggle only to arrive at an 
ever diminishing price.95  However, if we recognize a personality 
interest in the musical work, we are more apt to see that the 
conclusion imposes categorical opposition between music author 
and consumer.96  If music is really information that should be free 
to consumers, authors are mere service providers who require no 
more incentive to create than the prevailing wage.  Copyright law 
should avoid that.  While the author’s personality interest is only 
faintly drawn in copyright jurisprudence,97 a consumer interest has 
no recognized basis.98 
Second, the same technological changes that give rise to a 
belief that music is information demonstrate that a music author’s 
personality interest may easily converge with his economic 
interest.99  Digitization, as we will see in the final Part, greatly 
reduces the costs of music production.100  With lower costs come 
expectations of lower prices to consumers.101  Eventually, as A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.102 teaches, those expectations join 
with the self-help nature of new technologies to take for nothing 
what one no longer wishes to negotiate on the market.103  The 
lesson of copyright law reform today may be that we struggle to 
 
 94 Id. 
 95 See Ku, supra note 6, at 306–319. 
 96 See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 61, 63 (2002). 
 97 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 reads: “Congress shall have the power . . . .  To promote 
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” See also 
Justin Hughes, The Personal Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 89–90 (1998). 
 98 Hughes, supra note 97, at 89–90. 
 99 See, e.g., WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 106(3) (West 2008). 
 100 See Ku, supra note 6, at 306. 
 101 Id. at 319 (explaining that even if the price is low, the consumer would still be 
“unwilling” to pay). 
 102 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 103 See Ku, supra note 6, at 273–74. 
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find effective ways to capture those lost fees for the author.104  
Given the technology, the capture problem may only increase in 
proportion to the range of uses that become available for the music.  
Each of these is both a potential loss of self (personality) and of 
compensation for the author’s present and future welfare 
(economic).  The music author must retain the rights with which to 
recapture those losses.  In the past, the loss of those rights was 
attributable mainly to the exploitative practices of record labels 
and intermediaries, as the next Part shows.105  In the future, as 
artists become more independent, those losses will be attributable 
mainly to the appropriative practices of consumers, as the final 
Part shows.106  Rights retention remains the best safeguard against 
whatever changes occur.  Ownership is not only the thing that may 
validate and remunerate now.  It is the foundation for an author’s 
wealth and control in the future.  In that sense, it represents a true 
investment of self that copyright law should encourage. 
Having introduced the duel theoretical framework (utility and 
personality) for conceiving of property rights in music, I look now 
to how these ideas took form in U.S. music history.  Specifically, I 
browse the history of African-American musical authorship to 
show how, like canaries in a coalmine, the appropriative harms 
committed against them were facilitated by the structure of 
copyright law and repeated against other musical authors. 
II. OWNERSHIP CAPTURE, BLACK MUSICAL AUTHORS, AND THE 
FRACTURE OF PERSONALITY: A SUBALTERN HISTORY 
This Part provides an abbreviated history of the law and 
business practices of music production in the United States, with 
particular emphasis on black musicians and the genres most 
identified with them.  I organize the mostly descriptive discussion 
 
 104 The online music industry continues to be very unstable and offers few sustainable 
business models for profitability. See, e.g., Brad Stone, Music Labels Ease Up to Assist 
Start-ups, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at B1 (describing the failure of multiple legal on-
line music start-ups and the corresponding lowering of major label license fees to new 
ones based on the inability to achieve profitability). 
 105 See infra Part II.A. 
 106 See infra Part IV. 
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chronologically, beginning with two important nineteenth century 
musical genres—spirituals and minstrelsy—and the legislative 
struggles to pass the 1909 Act.  I end with trends leading to our 
current digital environment.107 
Several conceptual fault lines emerge.  First, as Lisa Gitelman 
points out, the early legislative period saw the introduction of a 
dichotomy between “writing” and “reading,” which had 
tremendous implications for what received legal protection and 
arguably continues in some form to this day.108  Second, the 
secondary status given to performers and performance under 
copyright law has been a critical lever in determining the scope of 
economic benefit and artistic recognition under music copyright 
law.109  Third, there is a continuing tension between appropriation 
and mimicry in both the law’s treatment of claims as well as in the 
ability of black musicians in particular to benefit from their 
works.110  For them, where appropriation of their work facilitated 
mimicry by white performers, their labor was most easily 
expropriated.111  Finally, however, this capture of black musicians’ 
styles, songs, performances, and earnings often seemed to lead to 
“innovative escape”—a Houdini-esque maneuvering back into 
creative relevance and musical livelihood following the theft of 
 
 107 Music was often a puzzle for copyright, especially in the beginning. See Lisa 
Gitelman, Reading Music, Reading Records, Reading Race: Musical Copyright and the 
U.S. Copyright Act of 1909, 81 MUSICAL Q. 265, 273 (1997) (“The combination of 
pliable uses and new forms made music hard to pin down.  The varied economy of 
American music at the end of the nineteenth century was perched on the edge of mass 
culture: it relied on noninstitutional as well as institutional means of creating markets for 
its principal commodity, printed sheet music, while it proved less able to commodify 
musical performances, phonograph records, and piano rolls in a rational or universal 
way.”). 
 The history could be presented differently by treating, for instance, changes in 
technology as the critical moments in the system’s development, such as the move from 
sheet music to phonograph records, the introduction of radio, or the proliferation of the 
compact disc.  Alternatively, one could follow genres, tracking themes as they adapt or 
dissipate within the public’s consumption of one type of music or another.  I will attempt 
to include both perspectives in the chronology. 
 108 Id. at 275. 
 109 See Sunny Noh, Better Late Than Never: The Legal Theoretical Reasons Supporting 
the Performance Rights Act of 2009, 6 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 83–84 (2009). 
 110 See infra Part III.A. 
 111 RICHARD CRAWFORD, AMERICA’S MUSICAL LIFE: A HISTORY 197 (2001). 
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one’s earlier expression—and the emergence of new music.  These 
concepts describe a system of rights that devalued personality and 
would often subsume it.  Ironically, it also revealed artist 
personalities that persevered anyway.  Together, the concepts help 
define what it has meant to be a musician in the American music 
industry and provide a context for evaluating the copyright reform 
proposals that have been introduced since digital distribution. 
A. Cultural Capture and the Miner’s First Canaries: Spirituals 
and Minstrelsy in the Nineteenth Century 
From the beginning, the expression of personality through 
music has been both fraught and essential for African Americans 
and American whites.  It was fraught in that slaveholders 
demanded music from blacks, though with significant restrictions 
such as the outlawing of drums,112 and in the duplicitous way that 
blacks performed musical meanings in whites’ presence.113  It was 
also essential as a means of integrating and understanding lived, 
often excruciating, experiences.114  These general tensions were 
evident in two important forms of music, spirituals and minstrelsy, 
and both began during slavery and survived well after it. 
Spirituals—the sacred songs that emerged from plantation life 
such as “Go Down, Moses” and “Swing Low, Sweet Chariot”—
combined a religious poetry unique to slaves with many musical 
antecedents from African culture and the surviving rituals such as 
ring shouts.115  During and after the Civil War, white abolitionists 
collected and circulated these spirituals in the accurate belief that 
the music’s beauty would reveal the humanity of blacks and “their 
fitness to live as free Americans.”116  Beyond what the spirituals 
themselves meant to ex-slaves, the recognition by whites of the 
form represented a source of dignified personhood in authorship, 
one “owned” by slave creators and ultimately “shared” with whites 
 
 112 Id. at 410. 
 113 See, e.g., id. at 408 (describing how a slave song that started “I am going away to the 
great house farm, O yea! O yea! O yea!,” was “jargon to others, but full of meaning” to 
the slaves, who “told a tale of grief and sorrow”). 
 114 Id. at 408–09. 
 115 See id. at 416–18. 
 116 Id. at 415. 
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as distinctly “American.”117  (It is doubtful, however, that the 
economic benefits of creative authorship came to blacks upon 
publication of the spirituals.) 
Yet white acknowledgment of black personality was more 
ambivalent and opportunistic in minstrelsy.  During slavery, “[t]he 
minstrel persona offered white entertainers and audiences a chance 
to visit and explore expressive territory that would otherwise have 
remained private.”118  This occurred behind black face, performed 
by “negro impersonators” and “Ethiopian delineators” who 
mimicked stereotypical “coon” dialect, behavior, and attitudes to 
dance and music.119  White minstrels created demeaning characters 
like Zip Coon (the urban rascal) and Jim Crow (the country 
Sambo) whose popularity included White House performances.120  
White minstrelsy appropriated the music and the instruments used 
by black slaves, such as the banjo.121  It assumed falsity in the way 
that blacks presented themselves to whites and exploited this social 
mechanism as a liberating mask behind which whites could 
express social commentary about their own conditions.122  White 
minstrels engaged in a studied theft of black personality and music, 
creating a popular decades-long industry that black minstrels 
eventually joined.123 
The point of this music historical allegory so far is not to 
reiterate longstanding racial critiques but rather to illustrate how, 
during the emergence of distinctly American musical forms and 
the development of the nation’s early treatment of copyright, race 
was the artist’s first canary in the proverbial coalmine.  That is, the 
early imposition on music of common themes of racial hierarchy, 
 
 117 Crawford’s account suggests that this may have been one of the earliest instances of 
an American musical heritage: “In fact, the circulation of spirituals after the Civil War 
gave many white Americans their first hint that if the United States was a nation with its 
own distinctive music, the ex-slave population was in large part responsible.” Id. at 412. 
 118 Id. at 198. 
 119 See id. at 199–201. 
 120 See id. at 201–02. 
 121 Id. at 205. 
 122 See id. at 198–99. 
 123 Id. at 218.  According to Crawford, the trend lived on: “In their challenge to 
civilized decorum, blackface minstrels of the 1840s and early 1850s hold traits in 
common with rock-and-roll musicians from the 1950s on.” Id. at 198. 
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subordination, and role-playing for complex purposes of 
personhood would continue to play out as acceptable—even 
expected—constructs in how ownership and authorship were 
defined.  In particular, the subsuming of personality into economic 
interests by copyright law would facilitate the inequitable structure 
of the music business for most music artists.  It began largely with 
people who had no economic agency worth recognizing and who 
occupied the status of free labor—slaves and freedmen.  Almost 
none of these creators owned copyrights in their works. 
B. Legal Capture: Nineteenth Century Copyright and Passage of 
the 1909 Act 
The commercial exploitation of any copyrighted work often 
requires the participation of professional intermediaries to sell it.  
Much of the history of music copyright features the role of non-
author intermediaries, particularly publishers who, given the 
primacy of sheet music and their control of printing presses, have 
always been regarded as central to copyright’s scheme.124  It was 
their insistence that led to many of the provisions of the first 
copyright act in 1790;125 when music was added in 1831, only 
sheet music was copyrightable.126  These business-side facts of 
music production were reflected doctrinally in the idea/expression 
dichotomy, which privileged only music that had been transcribed 
into conventional notation.127  The creative-side consequence was 
to demand a basic literacy for copyright protection.  For the 
public’s enjoyment, music would be “read”—played at home on 
 
 124 Carroll, supra note 91, at 1410. 
 125 Susanna Monseau, “Fit for Purpose”: Why the European Union Should Not Extend 
the Term of Related Rights Protection in Europe, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 629, 643 (2009). 
 126 Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (amended 1856); see Joiner, supra note 2, 
at 46 (“The composers . . . did not consider seriously the various musical boxes, barrel 
organs, bird organs, chiming clocks and snuff boxes that had been known for centuries as 
encroaching on any of their rights . . . as these inadequate mechanical contrivances could 
play but a limited number of musical airs and could play them only under severe 
limitations.”). 
 127 See Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 TENN. 
L. REV. 321, 337 (1989) (discussing White-Smith Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 
(1908), and its implications for the idea/expression doctrine in various musical forms). 
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the piano, heard in performance.128  For ownership, music would 
be “written.”129  However, prior to the adoption of the 1909 
Copyright Act, musicians who sought ownership of their creative 
work could rely only on a hodgepodge of state common law 
rules.130  After transcribing her composition, an artist would have 
to follow the formalities to copyright registration with the 
Copyright Office, including deposit and renewal.131  Failure to 
satisfy these requirements would release the work to the world or 
at least limit the term of ownership.132  Music authors frequently 
had a difficult time obtaining and enforcing copyrights in their 
work.133 
The music publishers, on the other hand, did not have difficulty 
obtaining and enforcing copyrights, and they held a dominant 
position in the music industry until about 1920, largely because of 
their (sometimes shared) ownership of composition copyrights and 
their control over access to music consumers.134  Publishers 
exercised power during this period by giving songwriters a flat fee 
for their compositions, rarely paying royalties,135 and forcing 
songwriters to transfer their copyrights to them.136  At its height in 
the late nineteenth century, the group of powerful music publishers 
located in New York’s Tin Pan Alley engineered the country’s 
 
 128 Gitelman, supra note 107, at 285.  
 129 Id. at 275.  
 130 The Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831), covered 
only books, maps, and charts.  Statutory protection for other types of creative works 
expanded over time. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 719, 744–45 (2009). 
 131 NIMMER, supra note 28, § 7.16(A). 
 132 Some states enforced copyrights in unpublished works under state common law.  
Exclusive rights under the Act were limited to reproduction, adaptation (the right mainly 
to prepare derivative works), and distribution/performance. See id. § 7.16(A)(2)(b). 
 133 The difficulty partly came from the strict requirement on “deposit” under the Act.  
In order to facilitate the requisition of an author’s copyright, the Supreme Court, in 
Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939), held that the words 
“promptly deposited,” in section 13 of the Act, might not be read as a condition 
subsequent that, if not satisfied, would result in destruction of the copyright. Id. at 32. 
 134 See CRAWFORD, supra note 111, at 222 (“The sheet-music trade required several 
agents . . . .  Each played a necessary role, but publishers were the chief architects.”). 
 135 See id. at 472–73. 
 136 See id. at 473. 
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tastes in popular music.137  These publishers employed songwriters 
to produce new arrangements of existing songs and song 
“promoters” to ensure that their products were used in the most 
popular shows and played by the most popular bands.138  Tin Pan 
Alley controlled the music of Broadway, the concert halls, 
cabarets, dance halls, vaudeville, minstrelsy, and other popular 
music outlets.139 
Publishers would gain access to the original scores and re-
publish them, attributing authorship to the company or a composer 
related with the company,140 often reworking the original score by 
simplifying the melodies.141  Within this general practice, the 
exercise (or usurpation) of authorial power over black music—
changing, sanitizing, or simplifying it in order to satisfy perceived 
white tastes—is a trend that runs through the entire history of black 
musical authorship in the United States. 
Technology and America’s racial culture altered the balance of 
power in the late-nineteenth century music industry in ways that 
would be reflected in the 1909 Act.  Specifically, the dispute 
involving a music publisher and a manufacturer of then-popular 
piano rolls revealed the confusion over the copyright statute’s 
definition of a readable “copy.”  The defendant in White-Smith 
Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.142 had created perforated piano 
rolls of two popular “coon” songs whose copyrights had been 
assigned by the composer to the plaintiff.143  The legal issue in 
 
 137 See id. at 471 (“New York City’s magnetic pull in the field of entertainment during 
the nineteenth century’s later years turned it into the capital of popular-song publishing in 
the United States.”).  
 138 See id. at 474–75.  
 139 See id. at 471–76.  
 140 See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 150; id. at 162 (“[T]he players’ talents were seen by 
industries as a raw material, an abstract production resource that they alienated from the 
musicians.”).  
 141 Id. at 149.  
 142 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
 143 The songs were “Kentucky Babe” and “Little Cotton Dolly.” Id. at 8.  Below is an 
illustrative excerpt from a coon song, “Whistling Coon,” as recorded by the popular black 
minstrel George Johnson, probably in 1891, who used to sing it on the street. 
Oh, I’ve seen in my time some very funny folks, 
But the funniest of all I know, 
Is a colored individual as sure as you’re alive, 
He’s black as any black crow . . . 
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White-Smith Music mirrored the cultural issue: whether a 
perforated sheet, indecipherable to the human eye, was a copy like 
a duplicate page of sheet music?144  Underlying this legal issue was 
a cultural one: what were the racial meanings of a blackface genre 
that had once been seen but might, with the aid of technology, only 
be heard? 
The Court resolved the case in favor of the piano roll 
manufacturer because the perforations existed in some ambiguous 
realm between reading and writing.145  With the passage of the 
1909 Act, however, the legal conflict was resolved in favor of a 
composer’s right against unlicensed mechanical reproductions.146  
 
You may talk until you’re tired, but you’ll never get a word 
From this very funny queer old coon . . . 
He’s a knock-kneed, double-jointed, hunky-plunky moke 
But he’s happy when he whistles this tune . . . 
(Whistles refrain) 
He’s got a pair of lips, like a pound of liver split, 
And a nose like an injun rubber shoe, 
He’s a limpy, happy, chuckle-headed huckleberry nig, 
And he whistles like happy killy loo . . . 
He’s an independent, free and easy, fat and greasy ham, 
With a cranium like a big baboon . . . 
Say!  I never heard him talk to anybody in my life, 
But he’s happy when he whistles this tune . . . 
(Whistles refrain) 
TIM BROOKS, LOST SOUNDS: BLACKS AND THE BIRTH OF THE RECORDING INDUSTRY 1890–
1919, at 28 (2004).  As described by Gitelman, “the coon song was a complex, late-
nineteenth-century survival of an already intricate and naggingly visual experience, the 
midcentury minstrel show.” Gitelman, supra note 107, at 276.  The coon song was not 
part of minstrel shows, but shared its traditions. Id. at 277.  It peaked in popularity as 
reflected in sheet music sales in the late 1890s, eclipsing the popularity of minstrelsy and 
finding a place in recordings. Id.  This changed the class make-up of listeners. See id. 
(“Whereas minstrelsy had been an acknowledged white, working-class form, the coon 
song allowed middle-class penetration of its tradition, and coon songs were played in 
middle-class parlors, concerts, syndicated vaudeville, and the other bourgeois venues 
where sheet music was increasingly consumed.”). 
 144 See White-Smith Music, 209 U.S. at 17. 
 145 See id. at 18 (“These perforated rolls are parts of a machine which, when duly 
applied and properly operated in connection with the mechanism to which they are 
adapted, produce musical tones in harmonious combination.  But we cannot think that 
they are copies within the meaning of the copyright act.”). 
 146 Gitelman, supra note 107, at 283.  Congress swiftly responded to this decision by 
broadly drafting language that stated that copyright existed in music “in any system of 
notation or any form of record,” specifically passing § 1(e), which deemed mechanical 
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Unresolved was the racial question of a performer’s identity.  The 
composer of a coon song—black or white—feigned blackness by 
employing certain stereotypes; so did the performer—black or 
white.147  The composer’s identity as author was now protected 
under the 1909 Act, but not the performer’s.148  “[T]he result was 
an even more heightened sense of ‘the talent’ as a commodity.”149  
Further, without disclosure the race of the singer would remain 
ambiguous, leading to what Gitelman calls “racial 
ventriloquism”—the unseen white singer who sounded black—
which would only be enhanced with the popularity of radio and 
phonograph records.150  Of course, these developments had direct 
consequences for the economic and personality interests of black 
musicians whose works, styles and even caricatures were being 
appropriated by whites from a kind of cultural commons. 
C. Performance, the Phonograph, and Radio Under the 1909 Act 
Few factors would affect all musicians’ rights and incomes like 
the various and intense disputes about performance rights and 
performers under the 1909 Copyright Act.  This section looks at 
 
reproductions of music as copies. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 30 Stat. 1075, 
1076 (repealed 1976).  However, it also struck several compromises, one of which was 
the creation of a compulsory licensing provision in which once the “owner of a musical 
copyright has used or permitted . . . use of the copyrighted work upon the parts of 
instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, any other person may” 
do so provided they pay the copyright proprietor a two-cent royalty on each part 
manufactured. Id.; see Gitelman, supra note 107, at 285 (“[R]eadings under the 1909 act 
were made into writings.”). 
 147 In a sense, this type of music could be a veritable theater of racial performance.  The 
imitation of black musical origins by white composers and performers comprised its own 
idea of popular blackness, which itself could be reproduced—even by blacks, who 
adopted certain stereotypes of themselves to accommodate white consumer expectations 
of an authentic black sound.  Other types of music—namely, the blues, soul and later 
rap—employ their own conventions of racial performance based on popular stereotypes. 
 148 See Gitelman, supra note 107, at 283. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 277–78.  The performance of race, like the performance of musical 
composition, was often contested, and the resolution of the conflict coincided with the 
division of property rights under copyright. See id. at 276–78.  Limiting the rights in 
performance would not only limit the composer’s exclusive rights, but for manufacturers 
of phonographs and record companies, it might contribute to a more competitive market 
for performers. Id. at 283.   Thus, both a cultural and commercial rationale underlay the 
secondary treatment of performers.  
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the contests between publisher power and the power of two giants 
either in their infancy or not yet born in 1909, record companies 
and radio broadcasters.151  The denial of sound recording rights 
until 1972 reflects the early hegemony of publishers as well as the 
availability of state law alternatives.152 Their belated adoption is 
testament to the power shift that saw record companies eclipse 
publishers in the last decades of the twentieth century.  What is 
sometimes lost in the battle of titans is the near unanimous 
rejection of rights in performance that would have been critical to 
musicians’ interests.  After all, whether they were composers and 
performers or only performers, the majority of musicians then and 
now received most of their income as artists from performance.153  
The fact that the 1909 Act continued to regard most performance 
as, in Gitelman’s analysis, unprotected “reading” of protectable 
“writing,” severely disadvantaged many musicians for generations, 
especially black artists who were often rendered unprotected 
performers after the theft of their compositions by unscrupulous 
intermediaries.154 
Under the 1909 Act, one of the exclusive rights of a copyright 
owner was the right to “public performance for profit.”155  In its 
early days, the radio industry, as well as major radio users such as 
restaurants, hotels, and ballrooms, attempted to exempt themselves 
from having to pay public performance royalties.156  Broadcasters 
 
 151 See, e.g., id. at 271 (“‘[T]he industry,’ as it had now become, grew more and more 
musically oriented through the 1890s, dominated in the new century by three patent-
holding phonograph companies, American Graphophone (later Columbia), Victor 
Talking Machine (later Victor/RCA), and Edison’s National Phonograph.”); Paul Gitlin, 
Radio Infringement of Music Copyright, 1 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 61, 62 (1938), 
reprinted in 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 7, 15–17 (1998) (stating that “[r]adio had 
grown tremendously since the first broadcast by Station KDKA” in 1920). 
 152 See Gitelman, supra note 107, at 283–85. 
 153 See  supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Peter Kafka, The Road to Riches, 
FORBES.COM, July 7, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2003/0707/078.html (“‘The top 
10% of artists make money selling records.  The rest go on tour,’ says Scott Welch, who 
manages singers Alanis Morissette and LeAnn Rimes.”). 
 154 See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 148–49. 
 155 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 30 Stat. 1075, 1076 (repealed 1976). 
 156 See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); Herbert v. 
Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1916); Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929); 
SESAC v. N.Y. Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); M. Whitmark & Sons 
v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.J. 1923). 
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justified their claimed exemption on the ground that radio was 
essentially advertising for sheet music and record sales, despite 
mounting evidence that radio was becoming a market substitute.157  
In suits often brought by The American Society of Composers, 
Authors, and Publishers (“ASCAP”), publishers secured their 
rights under both the “for profit”158 and “public performance”159 
language.  The battles in Congress between the National 
Association of Broadcasters and ASCAP were just as unrelenting, 
with similar results favoring publishers.160  So the basic 
performance right held by composition copyright holders stayed 
firm.161 
But the manufacturers of phonograph records would have no 
such luck getting statutory protection for sound recordings.162  
 
 157 According to ASCAP, prior to 1925, a hit song had an average life of sixteen 
months and total sheet sales of 1,156,134; by 1932, the average life of a hit song was only 
three months and total sheet sales were 229,866. Gitlin, supra note 151, at 66.  In 1934, 
the number one hit “Love in Bloom” sold under 500,000 copies, even though it was 
performed 24,374 times on the air. Id.  In 1937, the top songs were “Chapel in the 
Moonlight” and “When My Dream Boat Comes Home,” both of which sold under 
500,000 copies, which was inversely proportional to the time these songs spent on radio 
airplay. Id. 
 158 See, e.g., Herbert, 242 U.S. at 591 (concerning the indirect benefit to a restaurant 
where the price of music is included in the price of food); M. Whitmark, 291 F. at 776 
(concerning an indirect benefit to department store from music broadcasts). 
 159 See, e.g., Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411, 412 
(6th Cir. 1925) (holding that, whether visible, live, or otherwise, the “artist is consciously 
addressing a great, though unseen and widely scattered, audience, and is therefore 
participating in a public performance”), rev’g 298 F. 628 (S.D. Ohio 1924); Jerome H. 
Remick & Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 16 F.2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1926) (broadcasting an 
unauthorized performance constitutes contributory infringement); see also Jewell-La 
Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. at 196–202 (holding that hotel’s reception and reproduction of 
public radio broadcasts to individual rooms and bedrooms constituted public performance 
for profit); SESAC, 19 F. Supp. at 5–6 (same). But see Debaum, 40 F.2d at 735 (holding 
that, by giving radio station a public performance license, the copyright holder “impliedly 
sanctioned and consented” to a café owner who played the broadcast for his patrons). 
 160 See Gitlin, supra note 151, at 15–17.  
 161 There were, of course, exceptions such as the juke box exemption. Copyright Act of 
1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 30 Stat. 1075, 1076 (repealed 1976) (“The reproduction or 
rendition of a musical composition by or upon coin-operated machines shall not be 
deemed a public performance for profit unless a fee is charged for admission to the place 
where such reproduction or rendition occurs.”). 
 162 The House Report for the 1909 Act stated: “It is not the intention of the committee 
to extend the right of copyright to the mechanical reproductions [records] themselves, but 
only to give the composer or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the 
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Three main reasons were offered.  First, Congress feared that a 
single company, Aeolian, would succeed in dominating the music 
industry by exclusively contracting with music publishers and 
buying up all recording rights in what would amount to a “musical 
trust.”163  Second, Congress felt that sound recordings did not 
constitute “writings” as intended by the Constitution, nor were 
record companies or performers deemed “authors.”  Third, there 
was state copyright and common law unfair competition to protect 
against unauthorized copying.164 
To some extent, state law did protect sound recordings under 
either common law copyright or unfair competition.165  Yet, for our 
 
[compulsory licensing] provisions of the bill, of the manufacture and use of such 
devices.” H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7–9 (1909). 
 163 Robert T. Mowrey, The Rise and Fall of Record Piracy, 27 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 
(ASCAP) 155, 163 (1982).  For the same reason, Congress implemented the compulsory 
license provision.   
They [Congress] were first inclined to give the copyright owner the 
exclusive right to make sound recordings . . . however, it was learned 
that one dominant record company, anticipating the establishment of 
an exclusive recording right, had contracted with the leading music 
publishers for the exclusive right to record all their music.  To 
forestall the danger that this company would acquire a monopoly in 
the making of records, the committees adopted the device of the 
compulsory license.   
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. 
COPYRIGHT LAW § 7a (1961). 
 164 Legislative committees held hearings to take up the issue of sound recording rights 
under the Act during the latter part of the 1920s, when phonograph records gained 
significant popularity in the market and at least four different times in the 1930s. See 
Gitlin, supra note 151, at 70–71, 78–79, 81–83, 85.  During House hearings in 1939, 
broadcasters reiterated their arguments; authors and publishers reiterated theirs, adding 
that the common law provided sufficient protection; and even lawyers chimed in to argue 
for contractual, rather than ownership solutions to recording infringement. See BARBARA 
A. RINGER, THE UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION OF SOUND RECORDINGS 33 (1957) 
[hereinafter RINGER STUDY].  In the 1939 report by the ABA Copyright Committee, the 
drafting of the bill was deemed defective, but the committee unanimously embraced the 
idea of a copyright for recorded performances, and also mentioned that the subject of 
authorship “should be determined as a matter of contract between the respective parties 
contributing to the composite result, continuing the assumption of the present act that an 
employer for hire has capacity for authorship.” Id. (citing Committee Reports, 
1939 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 18). 
 165 According to Professor Nimmer, common law copyrights vest in an author of a work 
when the following three elements are met: 1) there is an expression beyond an abstract 
C01_TROUTT_3-9-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2010  1:04 PM 
2010] I OWN THEREFORE I AM 407 
purposes, the case law reveals the difficult position of musical 
performers under a rights regime that consistently excluded them.  
For example, in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc.,166 
Fred Waring, a white man and one of the most prominent orchestra 
leaders of the day, sued a broadcasting company for playing his 
recordings over the air.167  He had no exclusive right to public 
performance for profit under the federal copyright regime, because 
his were interpretations of popular compositions.168  But the court 
was determined to find a remedy under a property theory for 
performers capable of unique artistic contributions.169  The 
rationale went beyond mere labor or economic incentives to create, 
but to some characteristic of personality.170  “A musical 
composition in itself is an incomplete work; the written page 
evidences only one of the creative acts which are necessary for its 
enjoyment; it is the performer who must consummate the work by 
transforming it into sound,” said the court.171  Further, “such a 
property right inheres in the case of those artists who elevate 
interpretations to the realm of independent works of art.”172  
Furthermore, because such a rendering can be captured and 
reproduced, the rendering can be deemed property as firm as any 
corporeal property.173  Unfortunately, the Waring reasoning was 
 
idea; 2) it is original to the author; and 3) it is unpublished. NIMMER, supra note 28, § 
4.02(C). 
 166 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937). 
 167 Note that the party bringing the suit was not the copyright holder in the musical 
composition (who could have a claim if the broadcast were unauthorized), but the 
recording artist, whose product (the recording) was not protected under federal copyright. 
 168 Interestingly, the previous year, Waring actually applied to the Copyright Office for 
a copyright on his musical interpretation of the song “Lullaby of Broadway.” Walter L. 
Pforzheimer, Copyright Protection for the Performing Artist in His Interpretive 
Rendition, 1 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 9, 12 (1938).  The Copyright Office rejected 
the application as being beyond the scope of federal copyright law. Id. 
 169 See Waring, 194 A. at 635. 
 170 See id. at 643. 
 171 Id. at 635. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 632.  The court seemed to imply that the interpretation has to be assessed as to 
its artistic value. See id. at 635; see also Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder 
Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 489–90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). 
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not generally followed and was even repudiated on the ground that 
Waring’s recording constituted a publication to the world.174 
As a performer, Fred Waring was exceptional.  During the 
early part of the twentieth century, most performing artists, 
particularly black ones, suffered a distinct lack of bargaining 
power among another set of music industry intermediaries, venue 
owners.175  While the publishers controlled the sheet music 
revenues, the venue owners controlled the live performance 
revenues.  All but the most popular bands and musicians were 
subject to low, flat fee payments for performances, even when 
admission revenues were extremely high.176  As touring circuits 
developed, owners used booking agents to coordinate 
performances, and these agents quickly controlled access to 
thousands of venues across the country.177  Popular performance, 
therefore, was an arena of competitive conflict in which musicians’ 
share of financial rewards was customarily subordinated to non-
musician intermediaries.178  These relationships hardened with the 
growth of the industry fueled by phonograph records and radio, 
and they were accompanied by the rise of Jim Crow and the 
migration to northern cities of so many black musicians from the 
South.179  This legal and business architecture combined with 
social relations at the time to facilitate the dispossession of music 
author and performer’s rights.  The personality harms lamented by 
Ornette Coleman, a jazz musician, were commonplace. 
 
 174 See RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 87–90 (2d Cir. 1940) (Hand, J.) 
(“[W]e think that the ‘common-law property’ in these performances ended with the sale 
of the records and that the restriction did not save it; and that if it did, the records 
themselves could not be clogged with a servitude.”). 
 175 See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 148–49. 
 176 See id. at 148. 
 177 See CRAWFORD, supra note 111, at 476 (“In 1896, six of these [booking] agents 
joined together to form the Syndicate . . . [and by] 1926, the Syndicate boasted a network 
of some seven hundred theaters nationwide.”).  Because musicians and bands relied on 
consistent touring for income, they were subject to the attitudes and preferences of the 
booking agents. Id.  During periods when it was typical for bands to play at one venue for 
long periods of time, owners would threaten and carry out physical violence against 
bands who attempted to play elsewhere, and booking agents would use slander or 
influence to get musicians banned from touring circuits. See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 
146–47.  
 178 See CRAWFORD, supra note 111, at 478. 
 179 See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 58. 
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1. Jazz Music 
Jazz music’s place in this analytic chronology brings together 
themes central to an understanding of industry capture of artists’ 
rights amid important racial dynamics.  It illustrates more of the 
imitative practices apparent in minstrelsy as well as the 
appropriation of black creative ownership by an industry controlled 
by and catering to whites.180  More subtly, jazz history represents 
dueling adaptations that occurred partly as a result of 
appropriation.  That is, white record producers and club owners 
often adapted black musical styles to perceived white consumer 
tastes.181  Black jazz artists then adapted new musical forms to 
flourish creatively and, just as importantly, to overcome economic 
marginalization.182  In this case, discrimination, not ownership, 
motivated the creation of new expressions of artistic personality as 
well as new markets. 
This last point is evident in the very genesis of jazz, as a 
combination of various music disciplines, following the adoption 
of Jim Crow laws in New Orleans.183  Once a cosmopolitan city 
whose musical culture was influenced by the American black, 
Haitian, French, Spanish, English, Irish, German, Italian, and 
Cuban origins of its residents, as well from rural and regional 
musical traditions,184 New Orleans became legally segregated.185  
The new legislation classified Creoles as Blacks for the first 
time.186  The false racial binary concentrated the disparate/existing 
musical influences to create a musical culture that was urban, 
 
 180 See id. at 148 (“‘[W]hites [in the 1920s] began to realize the talent Negroes had, and 
they began scheming how to commercialize it.’”); Gitelman, supra note 107, at 276–78 
(discussing the appropriation of black creative ownership in minstrelsy). 
 181 See NIK COHN, ROCK: FROM THE BEGINNING 13 (1969). 
 182 See JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, THE RECEPTION OF JAZZ IN AMERICA: A NEW VIEW 24 
(1988). 
 183 AFRICAN AMERICAN MUSIC: AN INTRODUCTION 147 (Mellonee V. Burnim & Portia 
K. Maultsby eds., 2006) [hereinafter Burnim & Maultsby]. 
 184 See id.; see also THOMAS J. HENNESSEY, FROM JAZZ TO SWING: AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
JAZZ MUSICIANS AND THEIR MUSIC 1890–1935, at 15 (1994). 
 185 Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 147. 
 186 Id.  Now, Creoles and Blacks had a common prejudice against them.  This narrative 
supports the theory that Jazz was formed through a combination of Blacks, who were 
known for their brass and string band blues music, and Creoles, who were known for 
their instrumental virtuosity, music literacy, and training in classical music. See id. 
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competitive, sometimes violent, heavy on instrumental 
improvisation, and consciously virtuoso.187  New Orleans jazz 
musicians early on thought of themselves as highly skilled 
“artists.”188 
The dissemination of jazz also has roots in racial 
discrimination.  Many jazz musicians joined the Great Migration of 
blacks fleeing lynching and Jim Crow oppression and seeking 
better economic opportunities in northern cities.189  This 
established Chicago as a destination for New Orleans musicians,190 
and, like New York, it developed a complex performance culture 
that promoted jazz music from within dance halls, local 
cabarets,191 and touring circuits.192 A host of new intermediaries 
emerged such as managers, promoters, and booking agents to 
coordinate the various venues and performances.193 
Along with the popularity of the music blacks brought came 
familiar patterns of exploitation and racism.194  For instance, the 
Theater Owners Booking Agency (“TOBA”) was the first booking 
agency to feature black acts on touring circuits,195 but was 
renowned for low wages and discriminatory policies, taking on the 
 
 187 See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 26–37. 
 188 Id. at 37. 
 189 See id. at 43.  Of those that migrated from South to North between 1915 and 1920, 
60,000 migrated to Chicago. Id. at 45. 
 190 Id. 
 191 See COLLIER, supra note 182, at 9 (“[A]s the music began to move north and west, it 
was being played in the main in cabarets and dance halls populated with prostitutes, 
despite occasional forays into vaudeville, and the impression that the music was 
somehow related to sexual sin was generally accurate.  Now, however, with the success 
of the Original Dixieland Jass Band at a prestigious restaurant, the music was seen as 
more respectable.”). 
 192 Hennessey notes that the bulk of black Americans still lived in the rural areas, 
especially the South, in the period from 1914–23. HENNESSEY, supra note 184, at 49.  
The tradition of circus and vaudeville tent show gave way to vaudeville theater, dance 
halls, and cabarets. See id.  Many of these venues became part of regional touring circuits 
to which local and regional jazz bands had access. See id. at 54. 
 193 See CRAWFORD, supra note 111, at 476. 
 194 PERETTI, supra note 68, at 148 (“Black players found, as Earl Hines put it, that 
‘whites [in the 1920s] began to realize the talent Negroes had, and they began scheming 
how to commercialize it.’” (alteration in original)).  
 195 Id. 
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nickname among Blacks “Tough on Black Artists/Asses.”196  
Promoters (and some band leaders) rarely paid royalties and 
routinely stole original works.197  Record companies usually paid 
flat fees to instrumentalists.198  Only the most popular songs were 
paid royalties.199  Rooted in the folk traditions of the rural South, 
many musicians were unacquainted with the idea of individual 
authorship and royalty rights.200  Some musicians who were 
savvier took advantage of their band mates by taking credit for the 
entire composition even though it was collaboration.201 
Of course, critical to the success of the genre was wide 
acceptance by white audiences,202 yet legal segregation and the real 
or perceived antipathy for black musicians severely circumscribed 
opportunities for black jazz artists.203  Thus, a critical pattern 
 
 196 Id. (noting that TOBA used black musicians extensively in its touring shows of the 
twenties but paid poor wages and enforced discriminatory policies). 
 197 See id. at 150 (noting that one Tin Pan Alley copyist had a room filled with Benny 
Carter arrangements that he went around and sold, to which Carter responded: “He’s such 
a nice man that [I] figured, ‘well, if he’s making a couple of bucks, what the heck, you 
know.’”).  Many musicians gained royalties only after legal proceedings, as stories of 
these unfair practices led musicians to become more careful and litigious. See id.  
 198 See id. at 148, 153 (“Record company agents did not always pay musicians as they 
promised, and written record contracts were rarely drawn up. . . .  Record companies kept 
artist payments as low as possible to maintain their profit margins.  Instrumentalists were 
usually paid flat fees (ranging from $30 to $75) for making both sides of a 78-rpm disk, 
and they never obtained royalties.”).  
 199 See id. at 149 (“[T]he American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers 
(ASCAP), founded in 1914, had begun to ensure that at least the best-selling song 
composers would get their royalties.”).  
 200 See id. at 149–50.  
 201 See id. at 150 (noting many bands worked out compositions together, but a band 
leader who was aware of ASCAP and the concept of royalties could take credit).  Duke 
Ellington was called out for just such a thing and responded by saying “everybody else 
steals from me.” Id.  Ellington would pay small sums for ideas but would not allow the 
originator to share in the large royalties. Id.  One frustrated band mate even said, “I don’t 
consider you a composer.  You are a compiler.” Id. 
 202 See COLLIER, supra note 182, at 12–14 (“It is critical to our understanding of early 
jazz and American culture to recognize that by far the largest proportion of the American 
audience for the music consisted of mainstream whites drawn from the whole spectrum 
of society, from the upper crust looking for new thrills down to working people paying a 
nickel a dance in the jitney dance halls. . . .  Jazz could not have survived as anything but 
a tiny local music had it been forced to depend mainly on finding a black audience.  From 
the beginning it was the white audience that provided the economic base for it.”).  
 203 For instance, the Chicago Federation of Musicians—led by Mobsters—was a 
whites-only union that commanded the highest wages. PERETTI, supra note 68, at 157–58.  
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begun during the minstrel era continued: Black musical genres and 
styles were appropriated as property by white composers, 
publishers, and promoters, then altered to more closely fit expected 
white consumer tastes and sold.204  In the early jazz period, this 
was demonstrated most clearly in the difference between “hot” 
jazz and “sweet” jazz.205 
The major record companies of the time included Victor, RCA, 
and Columbia.206  Many of the jazz bands that were recording on a 
regular basis were made up of white musicians, who tended to play 
in the “sweet” jazz style.207  While black bands were often denied 
opportunities to record, the style of jazz played also dictated the 
recording opportunities black bands had.208  During the first decade 
of recording, from 1918 to the late 1920s, the sweet jazz band 
dominated the popular music scene, both in the clubs and the 
recording studios.209  Large audiences remained for the hot jazz 
sound associated with black jazz bands,210 but recording 
companies and promoters alike focused on the sweet jazz sound.211 
 
Booking shows at hotels and clubs that denied access to blacks further diminished the 
opportunities for black performers. See Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 152. 
 204 See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 186–87. 
 205 See id. at 154. 
 206 Chris Morris, A History of Independent Labels, BILLBOARD, Nov. 1, 1994, at 131 
(noting that when recording became a big part of the industry, it was dominated by the 
majors, which, generally speaking, would dominate the music market place until the late 
forties and early fifties). 
 207 Peretti describes that style as follows: “This music syncopated mildly, rarely used 
the blues or swung, and it almost never stressed improvisation, and so it is rarely 
considered part of the great jazz tradition.” PERETTI, supra note 68, at 94. 
 208 See id. at 201–02. 
 209 See COLLIER, supra note 191, at 17–18 (describing how in the early twenties, 
symphonic sweet Jazz began to push out the hot jazz of black bands, dominating the field 
for several years and making many rich).  
By 1922 Vincent Lopez was commanding $5,000 a week for his 
orchestra . . . and Whiteman himself was paying his star clarinetist, 
Ross Gorman[,] . . . an astounding $400 a week. . . .  [M]usicians in 
the better-known orchestras were earning from $75 to $300 a week.  
By 1925 . . . [the] top bands [in New York] were being paid $10,000 
a week. 
Id.  White bands almost exclusively played for white audiences. Id. at 22. 
 210 See id. at 20, 22 (noting that “[b]y 1930 Duke Ellington was Victor’s second best 
seller” and that by 1931, Louis Armstrong had sold over 100,000 records). 
 211 See id. at 19–22 (noting that, during the twenties, when the orchestra band was the 
most popular but the “hot” jazz band was still around, music trade magazines paid more 
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The pattern of racial exclusion and appropriation continued 
into the swing era, well into the forties,212 when, except for a few 
of the most popular black-lead jazz bands, black musicians,213 and 
the music associated with them, were not heard on radio.214  
“Consequently, to the broader White public, swing did not appear 
to be Black music.  This perception was reinforced by Jim Crow 
barriers that kept African-American bands from being heard 
through the same high-visibility broadcast channels.”215  Even in 
modern jazz, as artists like Ornette Coleman and black intellectuals 
 
attention to the orchestra type band; however, in Variety, popular white “hot” bands were 
listed but not any similarly popular black “hot” bands). 
 To be sure, there were independent labels that dedicated their resources to recording 
and promoting the hot jazz sound during this period. See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 149 
(“Jack Kapp became a powerful benefactor to jazz when he wholly dedicated his 
successful American Decca company to popular dance music, [but] he nevertheless hurt 
the music by diluting it in the recording studio, simplifying melodic lines and eliminating 
much improvisation.”).  The recording business was one wrought with financial 
difficulties and uncertainties. See id. at 153.  Often, the independent labels could not 
sustain themselves long, and larger record companies would buy these struggling 
companies. See id. 
 In addition, unscrupulous treatment by managers exploited the vulnerability of black 
musicians—many of them illiterate or not formally trained musically—to convert 
ownership of their work. See id. at 147–50.  Professional managers took liberties with 
their artists’ creations. See id. at 147–48.   For example, Irving Mills, a singer/songwriter 
who managed Duke Ellington’s band, took partial credit for many Duke Ellington 
compositions to which he did not contribute. Id. at 148.  Also, “Paddy” Harmon, an 
owner of Chicago’s Dreamland Café, took credit for inventing a trumpet mute that Joe 
“King” Oliver and other black musicians had been using for decades. Id. 
 212 See COHN, supra note 181, at 9–13.  After the war, economics (the war) forced 
bands to assemble in smaller groups. See id. at 10.  But this also prolonged the popularity 
of the big band since record companies were not promoting the small band style during 
the interwar period. See id.  
 213 See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 154 (noting “sweet” dance bands dominated radio 
(mostly white) in 1930s to the detriment of “hot” jazz bands (mostly black)).  
 214 DAVID P. SZATMARY, ROCKIN’ IN TIME: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ROCK-AND-ROLL 19–
20 (1987) (quoting Johnny Otis, who argued that “in the thirties and forties, black music 
was summarily cut off the radio”). 
 215 Id.  The radio jobs that were available to black musicians were not desirable from an 
artistic standpoint because the musicians could not control the musical content. See 
PERETTI, supra note 68, at 162 (“The radio network jobs were the best paying in the jazz 
world, but they were few in number and fell often to those who were the most willing to 
let producers dictate their musical expression.”).  It became clear that musical production 
would be dictated by radio and record company executives’ determination of what style 
would sell; to them, the more “commercialized” the music, the better. See id. at 156. 
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like Harold Cruse would attest in the late-1960s,216 jazz was 
typically a tough business for jazz authors.  Whether recording or 
performance, the incentives to create that copyright ownership 
theoretically promotes had to come mainly from some other 
source. 
2. Rock and Roll & Rhythm and Blues 
The pattern of racial appropriation—black music artists 
developing a musical genre controlled first by white business 
intermediaries then by creative imitators, and black economic 
disenfranchisement from the financial gains of the music industry 
they helped to build and dispossession of ownership in original 
works of authorship and performance—continued after World War 
II and into the vast increase in popularity of recorded music on 
vinyl records.217  Rock and roll in its popular form emerged around 
1955–56.218  Major record labels could no longer deny the 
popularity of Rhythm & Blues (“R&B”) music, but they eschewed 
its black creators.219  As a result, major labels attempted to record 
 
 216 According to Cruse, beneath even the failure to award Duke Ellington the Pulitzer 
Prize, everything is appropriative harm. HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO 
INTELLECTUAL 110–11 (N.Y. Review of Books 2005) (1967).  The prize itself is not 
really that important, but what lies behind the denial of the prize, is: 
a whole history of organized duplicity and exploitation of the Negro 
jazz artist—the complicated tie-in between booking agencies, the 
musicians’ unions, the recording companies, the music publishers, 
the managers, the agents, the theater owners, the nightclub owners, 
the crooks, shysters, and racketeers.  The Negro creative intellectuals 
have to look into the question of how it is possible for a Negro jazz 
musician to walk the streets of large cities, jobless and starving, while 
a record that he cut with a music company is selling well, both in the 
United States and in Europe.  They have to examine why a Negro 
jazz musician can be forced to pay dues to unions that get him no 
work, and that operate with the same discriminatory practices as 
clubs, halls and theaters.  The impact of the cultural tradition of Afro-
American folk music demands that the racially corrupt practices of 
the music-publishing field be investigated. 
Id. 
 217 See Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 245–46. 
 218 Arnold Shaw, Researching Rhythm & Blues, 1 BLACK MUSIC RES. J. 71, 74 (1980) 
(“Chronologically, the R & B era embraces the 1940s and early 1950s, whereas rock ’n’ 
roll emerges in 1955–56.”). 
 219 See id. at 71 (noting Rock emerged as a direct result of R&B in the early ’50s). 
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white men with a black sound.220  A more up-tempo version of 
R&B with elements of soul music, “rock and roll”—a black 
vernacular term describing sexual relations—was being played by 
black musicians since the late forties.221  To obfuscate the source 
of the R&B music from which rock and roll developed, popular 
radio DJs such as Alan Freed used the term “rock & roll.”222  Rock 
emerged as a symbol of white teenage aggression and a rebellion 
from the manners and the music of their parents.223 
R&B, on the other hand, officially emerged as a distinct genre 
in the music industry in 1949 when Billboard provided a separate 
chart for the music.224  Up to that point all music created by black 
artists for black listeners was grouped under the designation “race” 
record.225 
However, R&B, as it came to be defined musically, was being 
played since the early 1940s.226  At that time, jazz had experienced 
a temporary decline as a performance art.227  World War II led to 
fewer men in the country; band personnel were unstable, and 
ballrooms closed.228  Smaller bands were formed to play smaller 
venues; these bands developed new musical repertoires, 
specifically bebop and R&B.229  The creators of these new 
repertoires were former jazz and blues musicians who joined 
together.230  The styles were adopted by young adults raised in 
 
 220 See id. at 72. 
 221 See SZATMARY, supra note 214, at 15–19 (noting Little Richard and Chuck Berry 
were the first established “rock and roll” artists, a term used by blacks for sex and first 
used to describe all R&B artists). 
 222 COHN, supra note 181, at 13. 
 223 See id. at 14–15 (noting teens had money and needed things to spend it on, which 
created a market for all things teen, especially music). 
 224 Matthew A. Killmeier, Race Music, ST. JAMES ENCYC. OF POP & CULTURE, Jan. 29, 
2002, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_g1epc/is_tov/ai_2419101005/ (noting that the 
term “R&B” was first used by Billboard in 1949, replacing the use of “race” to describe 
black music by black artists). 
 225 See Greene, “Copynorms,” supra note 19, at 1189–90.  
 226 See Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 255 (noting that the Orioles were 
formed in 1946 and are considered the first rhythm and blues vocal harmony group).  
 227 See id. at 248.  
 228 Id.  
 229 Id.  
 230 Id.  
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impoverished urban environments whose musical influences came 
out of black church music, such as jubilee and gospel.231 
On the business side, R&B was primarily produced by small 
independent record labels and grew as a result of longstanding 
industry conflicts.232  Independent record labels recognized the 
market potential for R&B because of its popularity among 
teenagers, and further because of the fact that major labels still did 
not want to record or market to blacks, a situation that had 
persisted since the dawn of the swing era.233  They aggressively 
sought R&B acts.234 With the major recording companies ignoring 
the R&B market, along with the availability of independent 
pressing plants, many independent labels entered the music 
business.235  At the same time, the National Association of 
Broadcasters formed its own performing artists’ organization, 
Broadcast Music Incorporated (“BMI”), ending ASCAP’s virtual 
monopoly, creating “a cultural space for [R&B] artists.”236 
R&B then entered the mainstream through radio, specifically 
independent radio,237 where it became fodder for imitation and 
appropriation.  The advent of television had devastated network 
radio and spawned the growth of independent stations needing to 
appeal to their own audiences.238  R&B discs were banned at white 
 
 231 Id.  
 232 See Killmeier, supra note 224. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Chris Morris has noted: “In the 10-year period following the end of World War II, a 
group of fast-moving indie labels keenly read the barometer of mass taste and issued 
music by groups and artists who would virtually define the currents of popular music 
through the first rock’n’roll era.” Morris, supra note 206, at 132.  Thus, for the first time 
independent labels were in control of popular music. 
 235 Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 399. 
 236 Id. at 398.  But radio listeners might no longer have access to ASCAP songs. Id.  
While ASCAP’s members included the industry catalogues for Broadway and film, BMI 
turned to the songwriters themselves for membership.  Id.  “This move signaled a new era 
in Black popular music in the sense that ASCAP, and its considerable influence in 
shaping public taste, was challenged publicly for the first time, creating a cultural space 
for [R&B] artists.” Id. 
 237 See SZATMARY, supra note 214, at 19.  Television made radio space available to 
more recording artists. Id.  It was curtailed during the war but became more popular and 
affordable after.  By absorbing the network radio shows (all white), television allowed 
radio to be more available to black artists. Id. 
 238 Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 399.  
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stations, which contributed to artists’ rampant covering in 1955–
56.239  Labels recorded covers of the music with white groups and 
changed the arrangements to make it more palatable for radio and 
mainstream America.240  Only after teens began to demand the 
genuine source did major recording companies begin to record 
black artists.241 
Yet the practice of “racial covers” reveals how explicit 
statutory provisions worked against black R&B artists.242  Without 
the ability to make white covers of black songs under the Act’s 
compulsory license mechanism,243 the industry would have had to 
alter its racist behavior sooner—playing black artists on white 
stations, signing black R&B artists to major labels, and expanding 
the opportunities for popular and financial recognition for black 
musical authors.244 
 
 239 COHN, supra note 181, at 13. 
 240 Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 246.  
 241 See id. at 246–47 (“With few exceptions and adhering to the social practices of a 
segregated society, record labels initially promoted these groups exclusively in African 
American communities.”); see also id. at 262 (“[R]hythm and blues remained popular 
among White youth.  Record labels, eager to cater to the musical tastes of this group, 
pondered new and noncontroversial strategies to market this music across racial, class, 
and generational lines.”).  
 242 As R&B and rock artist Bo Diddley said of the effect of covers on his career as an 
innovator: “With me, there had to be a copy. . . .  They wouldn’t buy me, but they would 
buy a white copy of me.  Elvis got me.  I don’t even like to talk about it.” SZATMARY, 
supra note 214, at 25. 
 243 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (repealed 1976). 
 244 See Neela Kartha, Comment, Digital Sampling and Copyright Law in a Social 
Context: No More Colorblindness!!, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 218, 224–28 
(1997) (arguing that the compulsory license provision of the Copyright Act disempowers 
African-American music artists).  Interestingly, at the same time the practice of racial 
covers was occurring, in its 1961 report, the Register of Copyrights recommended to 
Congress a sweeping revision of the Copyright Act that would eliminate the compulsory 
licensing provision entirely. See REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE 
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted 
in 6 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1, 717 (George S. Grossman 
ed., 2001). 
 The report reiterates the record industry’s main arguments against the elimination of 
the compulsory license.  According to the Recording Industry Association of America 
(“RIAA”): (1) a variety of recordings of a musical work are beneficial to the public, and 
without a compulsory license, music publishers/composers would grant exclusive 
licenses that would prevent this; (2) compulsory licenses enable smaller record 
companies to exploit the same music as larger ones, and thus stay in business; and (3) 
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On the back of rock, the record industry experienced enormous 
growth during this time period, increasing sales three-fold by the 
end of the 1950s.245  Independent labels reaped most of these early 
rewards,246 as the major labels avoided recording this music.247 
Many majors responded by attempting to buy the smaller 
independent labels or individual artists.248 
The exploitation of black artists during the period of R&B’s 
rise in popularity is now the stuff of legend and litigation.  For 
instance, Chuck Berry successfully sued the Beach Boys for 
 
music publishers and composers actually benefit from the multiplicity of records. Id. at 
714. 
 The rejoinders by the Register are also noteworthy.  First, even without compulsory 
licenses, music publishers and composers would probably still issue multiple licenses 
anyway, but with the added benefit that they could refuse licenses to irresponsible or 
undesirable recordings. Id. at 715.  Second, even if music publishers and composers were 
to issue more exclusive licenses, this might be beneficial because record companies 
would then be forced to take on more new music. Id.  In other words, while variety in the 
number of recordings of one work may be sacrificed, the offset is the variety of the actual 
works recorded.  Third, while it is true that under the present scheme, smaller companies 
can make competing renditions of a song by a bigger company, if a smaller company 
were to have exclusive licenses, and if the smaller company is lucky to have taken on a 
song that turns out to be a hit (the idea is that you never know what’s going to be a “hit”), 
they would not have competition from larger companies. Id. at 715–16.  
 The thrust of the Register’s arguments go to concerns about the integrity (non-
distortion) of a song with “bad” covers—a moral rights-type interest.  The RIAA’s thrust 
goes to free access concerns.  Both positions have merit.  However, neither addressed the 
widespread practice of racial covers, though both certainly could have included the issue 
within the framework of their arguments. 
 245 See SZATMARY, supra note 214, at 54 (“Record sales went from 189 million in 1950 
to almost 600 million by the end of the decade.”). 
 246 See Morris, supra note 206, at 132 (“The indies gained substantially in this 
rock’n’roll gold rush: According to a breakdown of top 10 singles on Billboard’s charts 
by rock historian Charlie Gillett, indies accounted for 59 of the 89 top 10 records in 1959, 
as opposed to only 11 of 51 entries in 1955.”).  
 247 See id. at 131–32 (“The reasons for the upswing in the indie trade were numerous . . 
. [and indie labels] were more than happy to cater to the niche tastes of audiences that 
were not being served by the major labels’ pop-skewed artists.”).  
 248 See id. at 136 (“Consolidation became a byword in the record industry once more 
during the ’60s.  Two formidable New York indies with storied catalogs—Elektra 
Records, the folk-based imprint founded in 1950 by Jac Holzman, and Atlantic Records, 
started up in 1948 by Herb Abramson and Ahmet Ertegun, were both acquired by 
National Kinney Corp. in the late ’60s, becoming . . . the industry’s market-share leader 
in the ’90s, the Warner Music Group.”). 
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copyright infringement of his compositions.249  Muddy Waters 
settled with Led Zeppelin for the expropriation of his work.250  
Many lesser known artists were not as successful in ever 
vindicating their rights as authors and performers.251  The financial 
losses, as discussed in the last Part, constitute staggering harms 
when compared to the future value of so much of the era’s music.  
However, the appropriative harm to personality in the theft of song 
and style and the lost opportunities that routinely resulted from 
common business models represents a defining characteristic of 
risks to music authors even in the later part of the twentieth 
century. 
3. Soul Music 
Soul was the new popular black music of the 1960s,252 
representing an altered black vernacular that combined the 
urbanization of black culture with so many of the rural, Southern, 
and gospel influences of the past.253  On the business side, the 
launch of soul music’s Motown Records by Berry Gordy in 1959 
marked a new epoch as the crystallization of many of the creative 
and business trends described thus far.254  Yet Motown also 
represented features of black musical experience we have already 
seen: the dialectic of self-disguise and white mimicry;255 the 
requirement of suiting white tastes;256 and artistic innovation for 
the sake of a competitive advantage amid the chronic market 
failure of industry racism.257  What was different, however, was 
the successful emergence of black entrepreneurship on a grand 
scale.  It soon became the largest black-owned corporation in the 
 
 249 Alan Korn, Renaming That Tune: Aural Collage, Parody and Fair Use, 22 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 321, 341 n.106 (1992). 
 250 Aoki, supra note 19, at 763–64. 
 251 See Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 353–54 (noting 
that even after the 1909 Copyright Act, lesser known African American artists frequently 
had original work misappropriated by non-creators). 
 252 Candace G. Hines, Black Musical Traditions and Copyright Law: Historical 
Tensions, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 463, 485 n.159 (2005). 
 253 See COHN, supra note 181, at 127. 
 254 See id. at 134–36. 
 255 See Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 372–73. 
 256 See Gitelman, supra note 107, at 148. 
 257 See supra Part II.C.1. 
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country.258  Gordy combined talent management, producing, 
recording, and publishing.259 
Soul music also represents the era in which a convergence of 
artistic stardom (personality) and business acumen (control) started 
to take the form of a more assertive consciousness about ownership 
rights.  James Brown was one of the first artists to control his 
career, forming his own production company and getting a 
percentage of his performances.260  When his record label refused 
to finance a recording of a live show at the Apollo, he financed it 
himself.261  Sam Cooke, Curtis Mayfield, and Ray Charles, along 
with Brown, represented the handful of artists that were able to 
control their careers from an artistic and financial standpoint.262  
Nonetheless, they were the exception.  Although this was the era in 
which artists were increasingly autonomous as writers and 
performers, there was still a general lack of appreciation for 
owning intellectual property rights.  Record companies, even 
black-owned companies such as Motown, continued to keep the 
lion’s share of the ownership rights and profits.263 
Finally, soul music may represent the point at which a white-
dominated music industry began to re-examine the principle of 
 
 258 See Kenneth Meeks, Berry Gordy: America’s First Black Music Mogul: The 
Architect of the Motown Sound Ushered in a New Era of Music, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Oct. 
2005, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1365/is_3_36/ai_n15679382/. 
 259 See id. 
 260 See COHN, supra note 181, at 129. 
 261 Id.  
 262 See Gail Mitchell, Black Artists Struggle to Regain Ownership of Master 
Recordings, BILLBOARD, Mar. 2, 2002, at 89 (“Precedents for attaining control were set 
by such farsighted artist/businessmen as Cooke, [Ray] Charles, and Mayfield.  A handful 
of white acts is also part of that select group, including country major leaguers Buck 
Owens and Kenny Rogers and ’50s and ’60s-era acts the Four Seasons (the group’s 
VeeJay and Philips material), Paul Anka, and Fats Domino (their ABC-Paramount 
material).”). 
 263 See Debbie Snook, That MOTOWN Magic: The People, Hits That Launched a 
Revolution in Black Music, PLAIN DEALER, July 16, 1995, at 1J (“The Jacksons’ initial 
contract with Motown was for a 2.7 percent royalty rate, ‘better than previous deals,’ 
writes Nelson George, ‘but hardly generous in an era when royalty rates were often 8 
percent.’”); see also Mitchell, supra note 262, at 89 (“‘At Vee-Jay, there was no money,’ 
recalls Michael McGill of the Dells, whose first R&B chart hit was 1956’s ‘Oh What a 
Nite.’  ‘[Vee-Jay] would tell us, You make your money on the road.  The records are just 
to promote you.’”). 
C01_TROUTT_3-9-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2010  1:04 PM 
2010] I OWN THEREFORE I AM 421 
racially segregated tastes from a business perspective.  It was the 
occasion, in 1971, for a now-famous report that Columbia Records 
Group commissioned researchers at the Harvard Business School 
to conduct.264  The report’s findings presage a changed, but still 
racially ambivalent, attitude toward black music and musicians’ 
rights after the addition of sound recording rights in 1972265 and 
the wholesale amendment of the copyright act in 1976:266 
Soul music is one of the very few basic art forms 
which is indigenous to America, although its roots 
may be traced to Africa.  It has been and probably 
will continue to be a vital and influential force on 
contemporary popular music.  And soul is by no 
means a static music form.  It too will continue to 
change.  Companies able to work successfully in 
this art form will be in a position to relate more 
dynamically to its impact on other forms of popular 
music, such as pop and rock.  This will be 
especially important as these three music styles 
converge upon one another.267 
III. THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT AND THE EFFECT OF HIP-HOP AND 
INDIE ENTREPRENEURS 
The 1976 amended Copyright Act had tremendous potential to 
benefit musical artists—especially performers—who, in 1972, 
 
 264 The “Harvard Report,” as it is known, is not publicly available, but numerous 
writers have seen it and commented on its contents. See, e.g., Yvonne Bynoe, Money, 
Power, and Respect: A Critique of the Business of Rap Music, in R&B (RHYTHM AND 
BUSINESS): THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC 200, 204 (Norman Kelley ed., 
2005).  Bynoe summarized the findings as follows: soul music has a broad appeal; 
cultivating black radio was important; black music consumers are a key test audience; 
and whites in the industry were too removed from black music. Id.  It recommended that 
CRG develop black personnel in-house. Id. 
 265 See Emily F. Evitt, Money, That’s What I Want: The Long and Winding Road to a 
Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 10 
(2009). 
 266 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; see also Evitt, supra 
note 265, at 10. 
 267 Bynoe, supra note 264, at 205 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting the Harvard 
Report). 
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nominally received for the first time rights in their sound 
recordings.268  Specifically, the 1976 Act now reduced the 
formalities for copyright ownership,269 extended the term to the 
author’s life plus seventy years,270 created compulsory licensing 
mechanisms that facilitate wider performance of musical 
compositions;271 and finally codified a right in public performances 
for sound recordings.272  The Act made copyright’s bundle of 
rights divisible273 and added a right of termination of transfers after 
thirty-five years.274  Its limitations and exceptions are substantial, 
including the express adoption of fair use275 and provisions 
limiting an artist’s say in the use of her work by cable broadcasters 
and satellite carriers.276 
However, the limitations on performance rights in sound 
recordings may be the most telling in terms of the imbalance of 
power between artists and intermediaries.  The new right was 
narrowly drawn to permit claims for infringement only when non-
trivial amounts of the actual recording were reproduced without 
permission.277  The same is true for the sound recording artist’s 
derivative right, which, unlike the composer’s right to prevent 
substantially similar adaptations, is only triggered by an exact 
duplication.278  Lastly, the sound recording artist has no exclusive 
 
 268 Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 1, 5, 19, 20, 26, 101 (2006)). 
 269 Compare Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2544–
45 (1976) (providing that copyright attaches upon fixation in a tangible medium of 
expression), with Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 10, 30 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed 
1976) (providing that copyright attaches upon publication and notice). 
 270 17 U.S.C. § 302. 
 271 Id. §§ 115, 801–03. 
 272 Id. § 106. 
 273 Id. § 201. 
 274 Id. § 203. 
 275 Id. § 107. 
 276 Id. § 111. 
 277 Id. § 114(b). 
 278 Id. 
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right in public performance—only the composer279 (usually half 
music publisher) does.280 
A. The 1976 Act: Resistance, Entrepreneurism and 
Conglomeration 
Most observations about what the artist could or couldn’t have 
under the 1976 Act are academic, because the standard recording 
contract includes an assignment of all the recording artist’s rights 
in the work.281  In fact, the standard record deal is more like a 
personal services employment agreement under which the creative 
artist’s efforts are expressly made a work-for-hire.282  The record 
label is, in most cases, the legal “author.”283 
It is important to note that the 1976 Act was passed during a 
period in which albums (“LP”s), rather than singles, were 
dominant in recorded music, and recording, marketing, and 
distribution costs for a completed album were substantial.284  The 
sheer number of technical contributors to the finished work in 
some ways justified a greater degree of control over the work by 
the party making the greatest capital investment—the record 
company.285  However, it is by no means clear that the labels had 
to take as much as they did.  The facts show artists at a tremendous 
disadvantage, notwithstanding provisions in the new Act to the 
contrary.286 
Nor is it clear why the Act’s structure so easily allowed non-
creative interests to own creative rights.  The termination clause 
 
 279 Id. § 114(a). 
 280 See generally WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SYDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC: 
THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE BUSINESS AND LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 133–
52 (10th ed. 2007). 
 281 See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 105–06 (2d ed. 1996) 
(providing the typical grant of rights provision in most recording contracts). 
 282 Cf. id. at 413. 
 283 Id. 
 284 See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 280, at 33. 
 285 Id. 
 286 See David K. Rehr Delivers Speech at Radio Ink’s Forecast 2008, US FED. NEWS, 
Dec. 4, 2007 (“Artists, desperate to ‘make it’ in a very competitive industry, often sign 
away their rights to the record label.  Before they know it, they owe the label money and 
can never get out from under their oppressive control.”). 
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protects creative artists against irreversibly imprudent assignments 
of their rights.287  Its inclusion illustrates that Congress, conscious 
of the history of discrimination against musicians and the 
disgorgement of the rights in their work, could have enacted a 
statutory bar on some valuable ownership transfers by artists.  
Arguably, the onus could shift to record labels to secure returns on 
investment and profit streams exclusively through contractual 
terms rather than to artists, who almost never do.  Royalties, 
specifically future royalties, could constitute an economic right 
alienable only by actual authors and performers of creative works.  
(They would probably be negotiated at substantially lower rates, 
but at least artists would own the asset for alternative modes of 
commercial exploitation.)  The legislative history demonstrates 
very little Congressional interest in such a regime.288 
Not surprisingly, during the last decades of the century record 
companies continued to profit enormously from the new rules and 
to engage in the same methods of racial appropriation of black 
musical authorship.289  What is again evident is the persistence of 
racial market segmentation, re-description of black music to satisfy 
perceived white consumer preferences and the economic 
marginalization of black artists—often in ways that probably 
diminished profits—from an industry identified by the public as 
more progressive, if not counter-cultural, on social issues.290  This 
time, however, the technological changes that have always 
influenced recording industry methods and economics would later 
provide the realistic possibility of industry transformation.  As 
we’ll see more specifically in the next Part, the lower production 
 
 287 See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006).  The Copyright Act’s termination clause permits an 
artist to terminate a prior grant of rights after a period of thirty-five years notwithstanding 
any agreement to the contrary (e.g., a waiver of the right in a recording agreement). Id. § 
203(a)(5).  Congress predicated the right on “the unequal bargaining position of authors, 
resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been 
exploited.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976). See generally NIMMER, supra note 28, 
§ 11.01–02. 
 288 See KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 280, at 10–12. 
 289 See PERETTI, supra note 68, at 148; see also Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black 
Music, supra note 16, at 353–54. 
 290 See James L. Tyson, Ad Agencies Walk Fine Line in Tapping Inner City Trends, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 27, 1996, at 8 (noting that pop radio stations in the 1970s 
hid black music behind the tag “urban contemporary music”). 
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costs and more democratic distribution infrastructure possible 
through the Internet would permit musical artists themselves to 
recapture the legal rights in their work and the economic benefits 
of exploiting them.291 
1. The 1970s and ’80s 
The music business changed a great deal in the 1970s.  Singles 
had driven the popular music industry for the previous two 
decades.292  Economically, this allowed independent labels to 
compete with the major labels and for mainstream market 
penetration by black soul and R&B artists.293  However, albums 
became more popular in the 1970s, increasing production costs.294  
Independent labels, where most black artists recorded, were not 
able to compete as readily as before.295  In fact, the “’70s were 
largely quiet times for the indies, as the music dismissively known 
as ‘corporate rock,’ and later disco, reigned supreme on the 
charts.”296  Independent labels—albeit in a different form and 
role—made a comeback only after the popularity gains by rap 
music.297  Notably, during the seventies, many more artists sought 
 
 291 See infra Part IV. 
 292 See Jack Egan, Pop Records Go Boom, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 31, 1983, at 56–57 (noting 
that singles dominated the music industry in the ’50s and ’60s). 
 293 See Morris, supra note 206, at 132 (“A network of independent distributors catering 
to retailers and jukebox operators stocking independent labels’ product has also begun to 
spring up.”). 
 294 See Rudy’s Corner, Singles vs. Albums (Mar. 26, 2007), http://www.rudyscorner. 
com/88/singles-vs-albums.html. 
 295 JAMES HASKINS, BLACK MUSIC IN AMERICA 161–62 (1987) (noting black music was 
not the popular music of the ’70s and ’80s, although disco and funk were around). 
A major reason, however, was changes in the record business itself.  
Once albums became more popular than singles, production costs 
soared, and small, independent labels like the kind Motown had once 
been could not compete with the major labels.  One week in the 
summer of 1984, ninety-nine of the records on the Billboard Hot 100 
were recorded on major labels. 
Id.  Since many blacks recorded on independent labels, this trend was bound to affect 
them. Id.  Even blacks who did record for major labels found that they did not get as 
much promotion as white stars who recorded for the same labels. Id. 
 296 Morris, supra note 206, at 134–35. 
 297 See id. (“By the mid-’70s, rap music had begun its rise out of the New York clubs; 
significant single releases by such acts as the Sugar Hill Gang, Grandmaster Flash & the 
Furious Five, and Afrika Bambaata & Soulsonic Force appeared on such labels as Sugar 
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to control their intellectual property rights.298  Not only were they 
demanding their fair share, they were also creating their own 
companies to manage, promote, and distribute their musical 
work.299  This upsurge in artist-owned distribution companies 
coincided with the establishment of black music departments by 
major labels.300 
By the early eighties, the majors focused on the single-
superstar format, many of whom were African American.301  Those 
artists who had reached the heights of Michael Jackson and Lionel 
Richie were promoted as pop acts.302  While more marketing 
dollars were pushed their way, the artists lost much artistic and 
managerial freedom with their new position.303  Pop music was 
also affected by the emergence of music videos, an important 
predictor of success,304 and the social beliefs behind another 
intermediary—MTV—beginning in 1981.305  In the first few years 
of video, black artists were categorically denied opportunities to 
 
Hill and Tommy Boy.  Within a decade’s time, the genre would experience its first 
platinum hit album, Run-D.M.C.’s ‘Raising Hell,’ issued by another New York indie, 
Profile.”).  
 298 See J.R. Reynolds, Study Recommends Changes in the Black Music Industry, 
BILLBOARD, June 1, 1996, at 24. 
 299 See id. (describing the successful upstart of Motown).  
 300 See id. (“In 1971, CBS Records commissioned from Harvard a feasibility study that 
led to the creation of the label’s black music department, which was the first in the 
industry.”).  Further, the study revealed that CBS record executives “were pleasantly 
surprised at just how together the organizations” they studied were. Id. 
 301 Burnim & Maultsby, supra note 183, at 409 (noting when the music industry came 
out of the early ’80s recession, the major labels focused more on the single superstar 
format, fueled by the worldwide success of Michael Jackson’s “Thriller”; many of these 
superstars were African American). 
 302 See id.  
 303 Id. (noting that big-time artists who were promoted directly under major labels’ pop 
divisions were forced to give up the management, attorneys, etc., who started their 
careers; only a few major artists were able to maintain black management).  
 304 But see Brian C. Drobnik, Truckin’ in Style Along the Avenue: How the Grateful 
Dead Turned Alternative Business and Legal Strategies into a Great American Business 
Story, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 242, 247 n.67 (citing interview with Steve Popovich, 
CEO, Cleveland International Records) (noting the music video has diminished the 
importance of radio as a form of promotion and that trends in radio play follows those in 
television play). 
 305 See Havelock Nelson, R&B Extremes Flare in the ’80s: Rap, Hip-Hop Exacerbate 
Generation Gap, BILLBOARD, Feb. 18, 1995, at 20. 
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appear on MTV.306  Michael Jackson was the first black artist to 
appear on MTV with his music video for the song “Beat It.”307  In 
1982, Tina Turner became the first black woman to appear on 
MTV.308  Once again, their success demonstrated that white 
audiences would pay directly for black musical entertainment. 
2. Hip-Hop Entrepreneurs 
It was neither the Copyright Act of 1976 nor the surge in the 
profitability of pop music that produced a major crack in the 
edifice of corporate ownership over musical works, but the 
defiance and independence of schoolyard rap music.  Rap and hip-
hop music did not remain independent throughout, as I discuss just 
below.  Yet their origins demonstrate a fierce entrepreneurism that 
reflected both knowledge of the exploitative practices of the music 
industry and a creative opportunism that resulted from social 
separation, access to cheap technology, and a creative intuition to 
break with pop conventions.309  Rap’s rising popularity during the 
eighties spurred the comeback of independent labels,310 such as 
Def Jam and Priority Records.311  Artist-owned entrepreneurial 
efforts also started to become more prevalent during the late 
eighties, as evidenced by rapper Luke Skywalker of 2 Live Crew 
 
 306 Id. (“‘When it first started airing [on MTV], [black artists] weren’t even allowed,’ he 
says.  ‘So people started adjusting their music to fit the format.’  All of a sudden, he says, 
executives ‘at record labels started telling writers this or that’s too black.’” (quoting 
songwriter and producer James Mtume)).  Thus, as in the early days of R&B, executives 
were trying to tone down black music to fit a white audience attracted to MTV. Id.   MTV 
refused to let black acts on so the execs assumed that its growing popularity required 
them to mirror their music to the station’s playlist. Id.  
 307 David Bauder, You Say It’s Your Birthday? MTV’s Turning Today, but You 
Wouldn’t Know It by Watching, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug 1, 2006, at D1. 
 308 HASKINS, supra note 295, at 165. 
 309 Hip-hop started as a social movement in the South Bronx in the 1970s. Burnim & 
Maultsby, supra note 183, at 410. 
 310 See Morris, supra note 206, at 134. 
 311 Id. at 136 (“Independent success stories have continued to crop up in the pages of 
Billboard to the present day. Through the ’80s, rap accounted for some of the indies’ 
biggest sales tales: Hardcore efforts by such L.A.-based gangsta acts as N.W.A. and its 
members Ice Cube and Eazy-E racked up major numbers for the Ruthless and Priority 
imprints.  Just last year, an independent scored a mega hit with one of the most 
ubiquitous rap singles of all time—‘Whoomp! (There It Is)’ by Tag Team, which moved 
a staggering 4 million copies for L.A.’s Bellmark Records.”). 
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forming 2 Live Crew Records in 1985,312 and soul artist James 
Brown buying a radio station in 1989.313  Despite the initial 
reluctance of major record companies to sign artists who proudly 
(and sometimes violently) asserted their affiliation with a 
marginalized inner city, hip-hop’s signature music, rap, has 
consistently been a major economic force in the music industry 
since the mid-nineties and is currently the second best-selling 
genre of music in the U.S.314 
Hip-hop artists, including rappers and hip-hop influenced R&B 
acts, have exhibited greater ownership and control interest than 
perhaps any genre.315  The trend gained momentum in the early 
nineties when popular rap artists increasingly produced records on 
their own labels, securing publishing and distribution deals with 
the majors.316  These deals became more prevalent throughout the 
nineties for three reasons: (1) artists were able to produce the 
music they wanted without acceding to pressure from, or 
compromising with, a record label, including independent labels 
 
 312 Connie Benesch, Taking Care of Business: Enterprising Rappers Cash in on Their 
Entrepreneurial Talents, BILLBOARD, Nov. 27, 1993, at 46. 
 313 LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Radio Regulation: The Effect of a Pro-Localism Agenda on 
Black Radio, 12 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 97, 130 (2006). 
 314 RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., 2007 CONSUMER PROFILE 1 (2008), available at 
http://76.74.24.142/44510E63-7B5E-5F42-DA74-349B51EDCE0F.pdf; see also Paul 
Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 983, 
992–93 (2004) (describing hip-hop’s influence on consumers); Alan Hughes, Hip-Hop 
Economy, BLACK ENTERPRISE, May 2002, at 70; Gail Mitchell, Black-Music’s Historic 
Week: Hot 100 Testifies to Mainstreaming of R&B/Hip-Hop, BILLBOARD, Oct. 18, 2003, 
at 20. 
 315 See Marlynn Snyder, Urban Entrepreneurship: Young Mavericks Make Noise with 
Their Own Labels, BILLBOARD, June 3, 1995, at 24 (“[Michael] Bivins started in the 
industry as a member of multiplatinum teen act New Edition and later formed R&B/hip-
hop trio Bell Biv Devoe.  His relationship with Motown began as a production deal with 
his Biv Entertainment, which launched successful careers for Another Bad Creation and 
MC Brains.  In addition to the Biv 10 label, whose first act is the popular Chicago teen 
foursome Subway, Bivins plans to expand his operation with Biv Films and Biv 
Clothing.”). 
 316 See id. (“Many of these mavericks have struck lucrative label deals with the majors 
to promote, market and/or distribute their releases.  Among these up-and-coming label 
heads are 26-year-old Michael Bivins, president/CEO, Biv 10 Records; Marion ‘Suge’ 
Knight, 29, co-founder/CEO, Death Row Records; Jermaine Dupri, 22, president, So So 
Def Recordings; and Sean ‘Puffy’ Combs, 24, president/CEO, Bad Boy Entertainment.  
[The four labels are joint ventures with Motown, Interscope/Atlantic, Columbia and 
Arista, respectively.]” (alteration in original)).  
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owned by businessmen; (2) they saw more money selling fewer 
units than they would if they sold more units with a major label; 
and (3) majors welcomed them because these deals helped keep the 
majors profitable.317 
Independent labels have recently played a more complicated 
role than previously thought, occupying less the role of more 
equitable and streamlined finder of talent and more as a conduit 
and sometimes partner to the major labels seeking to reduce 
production costs and hoping to avoid paying union wages.318  
Cooperating with indies allows majors to circumvent costly union 
agreements to which they are signatories, but indies are not.319 
Ultimately, hip-hop itself is a complicating genre for a project 
like this.  Its “street” origins and almost vernacular 
entrepreneurism when establishment companies shunned it is 
representative of the blues, jazz, R&B, and soul traditions before 
 
 317 See Mitchell, supra note 262, at 90 (“Like KRS-One, one of the more popular ways 
that contemporary artists have gained a measure of masters control is through joint 
ventures.  Such rappers as Master P, the Cash Money Collective, and others were well on 
their way to sales success before aligning themselves with major labels for wider 
distribution.”).  Also, being able to have significant sales as an independent entity attracts 
major labels and allows indies to keep most of the control: 
“Our sales gave us a lot of weight and pull,” says Cash Money 
CEO Ronald Williams, whose label is distributed through Universal. 
“We used to hear a lot about the majors—how they take control—and 
we didn’t want to go out like that.  But it’s going to be a fight right 
now for artists to keep their masters. You just have to fight to keep 
100% of your company.” 
Id. 
 318 See Michael Roberts, Papa’s Got a Brand-New Bag: Big Music’s Post-Fordist 
Regime and the Role of Independent Music Labels, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
BLACK MUSIC, supra note 264, at 24, 26.  
 319 Independent labels do not typically have contracts with the American Federation of 
Musicians (“AFM”). Id.  The majors are “signatory” companies with the AFM, and there 
are three contracts they have with musicians: the Phonograph Record Labor Agreement 
(wage scales and health and pension), the Phonograph Record Trust Agreement, and the 
Special Payments Fund (both for AFM members and free public concerts). Id. at 27.  The 
major may own up to 50% of an indie subcontractor and avoid the union agreements. Id. 
at 37–38.  Without direct major-indie competition, cooperation has led to equity deals 
and joint ventures, ownership sharing, and most vitally, deals over distribution. Id.  
Majors have also increased their distribution capacities. Id.  Distribution by a major of a 
non-union, non-signatory label relieves it of any obligations under the Phonograph 
Record Labor Agreement. Id.  
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it.320  Its intertextuality—the borrowing of previous works and 
integrating them, sometimes transformatively—is also reminiscent 
of some of the earliest black musical traditions, though the claims 
of theft by sampled but not compensated artists raises legitimate 
concern.321  However, it is the character of its entrepreneurial side 
that suggests something about the proliferation of economic motive 
and a muddier picture of the artist’s personality interest.  First, 
many hip-hop artists have succeeded in reaping greater financial 
gains by garnering extra-musical fame and exploiting it through 
merchandising, fashion lines, movie stardom, product endorsement 
and other pursuits unrelated to making music.322  Second, hip-
hop’s enormous “cross-over” appeal to white, suburban 
consumers—while putting the lie to the longstanding beliefs by 
white music industry executives that white consumers require 
sanitized versions of black music genres—reflects the 
internalization by black artists of many accumulated harms under 
American music copyright.323  More than a century separates hip-
hop and the participation of black minstrels in a form of music that 
involved the imitation through degrading stereotypes of black 
personalities, but some parallels are unmistakable.324  As Norman 
Kelley writes in a contemporary vein: 
To a certain degree, blacks have become the 
“accessorized other,” whose culture, through 
commodification, can be sampled and discarded, or 
used as a reference point for authentification.  Even 
more pervasive is the economic incentive for young 
blacks to act and perform in ways that conform to 
white buyers’ concept of “blackness.”  Rap music is 
supposed to be about “blackness,” as argued by 
 
 320 See Nelson, supra note 305, at 20. 
 321 See infra text accompanying notes 354–61. 
 322 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 314. 
 323 See Justin D. Ross, Offended? The Rap’s on Me, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2007, at B02, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/07/AR2007 
090702048.html (noting the absence of themes that would make suburban white 
customers uncomfortable). 
 324 JOSHUA SEFFINGA, HIP-HOP MEETS MUSIC VIDEO: THE NEW MILLENIUM MINSTREL 
SHOW 1, available at http://classweb.gmu.edu/ajryan/nclc375_s04/minstrel2.pdf. 
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some rappers, yet still plays into a market-based 
expectation or interpretation of the term.325 
As for the music author’s personality interest, the history since 
passage of the 1976 Act demonstrates less pronounced 
appropriation of black musicians’ creations as the music industry 
relied less on the mechanics of society’s racial caste system to 
exploit authors and instead used its increased power to implement 
a business model of onerous, though more uniform, contractual 
terms.326  Black musical authors functioned less as the miner’s 
canary in the world of musical authorship.  However, as the 
entrepreneurial pursuits of several soul and rap stars demonstrate, 
they continued to manifest a transformative aspect of creative 
authorship by innovating forms of music that avoided corporate 
capture (at first) and by demanding ownership control of their 
work.327 
B. Epilogue: Summary Elements, Authorship, and Personality 
Did changes in the 1976 Act—specifically the addition of 
sound recording rights—create more equity for musicians’ 
interests?  Certainly some who benefited from the tremendous 
growth and profitability of the industry would say yes.  Many 
would say no, especially those whose main body of work occurred 
before 1978 when the Act became effective.  As law professor K.J. 
Greene and numerous musicologists have demonstrated, the 
economic casualties to black artists covered by this subaltern 
history includes more than the routine exploitation that led Greene 
to analogize the early music industry to share-cropping.328  As a 
result of the expropriative law and practices described earlier in 
this Part, many of America’s best-known and appreciated artists 
were devastated by the combination of law and practice that 
 
 325 Norman Kelley, Notes on the Political Economy of Black Music, in THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC, supra note 264, at 6, 20. 
 326 See, e.g., Brian Ward, “All for One, and One for All”: Black Enterprise, Racial 
Politics and the Business of Soul, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC, supra 
note 264, at 142, 151; see also Bynoe, supra note 264, at 297. 
 327 But see Dipanitta Basu, A Critical Examination of the Political Economy of the Hip-
Hop Industry, in AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 258, 258 (2005). 
 328 Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 376–77. 
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expropriated profits from them.  The great minstrel composer 
James Bland, ragtime composer Scott Joplin, blues artists W.C. 
Handy and Bo Diddley all suffered the theft of significant earnings 
for their work.329  Jelly Roll Morton, a founder of jazz, Bessie 
Smith, the legendary blues singer, and Big Bill Crudup, one of the 
pioneers of rock and roll, all died destitute.330 
Under the 1909 Act in particular, a template was established 
for appropriating the work of black musicians.331  Together a 
variety of distributor-favored means converged against artists, 
including copyright formalities that either dispossessed poor, 
sometimes illiterate musicians through technical requirements 
(e.g., registration),332 doctrinal rules (e.g., idea/expression 
dichotomy),333 or specific statutory provisions (e.g., compulsory 
licenses for racial covers);334 exploitation and discrimination by 
unscrupulous intermediaries such as publishers, club owners and 
managers;335 adhesion terms within the standard contracts of 
record labels;336 and most importantly, the systematic application 
of leverage to divest both composer- and performer-authors of 
ownership of the copyrights in their work as either assignments or 
works-for-hire (or both).337  Most of these laws and practices—
though not the routine cultural appropriations and artistic 
mimicry—would work against all musicians regardless of race.  
However, just as important was the capacity for innovative escape 
demonstrated by so many black musicians unable to rely solely on 
economic incentives to produce work.  It is this aspect of the 
history that best indicates the character of an artistic personality 
 
 329 Greene, “Copynorms,” supra note 19, at 1197. 
 330 See id. at 1198; see also Gee v. CBS, 471 F. Supp. 600, 611–12 (E.D. Pa. 1979). 
 331 See Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 349–53, 376–77. 
 332 See id. at 353–54. 
 333 See Greene, “Copynorms,” supra note 19, at 1200. 
 334 See id. at 1202. 
 335 See id. at 1204–07. 
 336 See Sarah Ann Smith, Note, The New York Artists’ Authorship Rights Act: Increased 
Protection and Enhanced Status for Visual Artists, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 168 n.56 
(1984). 
 337 See Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music, supra note 16, at 377. 
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interest lost in later case law but described by the likes of Hegel 
and Radin.338 
I have argued that the author’s personality interest in her music 
is defined then not only by the presence of certain elements, but 
also by the absence of certain others, such as the dignity lost to 
exploitation and the corresponding resistance and resourcefulness.  
This is not the same thing as infringement, though it is similar, 
because infringement analysis always depends on the appropriation 
of specific statutory elements339 that may never be reflected in a 
standard recording contract or sharp practices that lead to the loss 
of leverage and the dispossession of one’s copyright.  In both, 
there is a taking, but what is taken may be categorically different.  
Nor is this necessarily remedied by moral rights.  Moral rights also 
protect only certain aspects of creative endeavor, and they do so 
after the fact (indeed, after the rights may have been fully 
transferred).340  Thus, moral rights protect aspects of what may be 
missing (absence) but after the author’s exchange of personality 
with the world.  In the case of either the lack of dignity during 
exploitation or the resistance to exploitation within the innovative 
escape, the author’s interest is actualized by something different 
from, though connected to, economic motive.  It is personality, 
which has been central to black musical creativity under almost 
180 years of American music copyright law, and it is not 
susceptible purely to economic analysis.341  Thus, we often 
 
 338 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971–78 
(1982); William Torrey Harris and the Hegelian Philosophy of Education, http://gyral. 
blackshell.com/hegel/hegedu.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2009) (“Hegelians viewed the 
study of art and music in schools as a means of achieving a more perfect union with the 
divine, and consequently, a means to ultimate knowledge.”). 
 339 See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006). 
 340 See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
 341 Another way to see this quality of personality is to consider the characterization of 
intellectual property goods as non-rivalrous. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: 
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 95 (1st ed. 2001).  Non-rivalrous 
goods are those whose consumption by one does little or nothing to impede, waste or 
deplete the consumption by another. Id. at 21.  Ideas are often used as the quintessential 
non-rivalrous good, and the leap is easily made to their expression. Id. at 95.  But all of 
this is mainly true when the source of the non-rivalrous good is deemed the state of 
nature or the cultural commons. Id.  When we instead consider the source of the idea’s 
expression, say musically, to be the creativity of a group of trained artists struggling to 
compose, arrange and perform a “new” work, it is harder to think of their output—the 
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recognize the presence of a personality interest by the kinds of 
harms that may be inflicted upon it.  Yet finding a remedy for its 
trespass in economic terms is not difficult because it is often tied 
inextricably to the economics of artistic creation. 
In sum, I have argued that the personality interest in music 
copyright is reflected in both its presence—the internal motives 
that govern persistent, devoted aesthetic production—as well as its 
absence—the persistence of real threats to dignity through 
exploitation and appropriation by necessary intermediaries, the 
features of the law that facilitate control by non-authors and also 
what we acknowledge as theft, or the infringement of one’s 
investment of self by other artists, the public and others.  However, 
the personality interest should be elevated from its prior lurking 
status and paired with the dominant economic interest.  The best 
evidence that this dual conception of copyright’s protectable 
interests is accurate may be the present, where in recent years 
music artists have attempted to draw greater attention to their 
routine exploitation as a result of standard record label practices,342 
 
good—as primarily non-rivalrous. Id.  Sure, the result will utilize musical conventions 
that did not originate with the group, but their work constitutes a version of what most 
would acknowledge as a process of “authorship” that draws upon limited creative 
resources. WILLIAM MOYLAN, THE ART OF RECORDING: UNDERSTANDING AND CRAFTING 
THE MIX vii (2002).  Should one artist quit early and exploit the collected work on his 
own before the others can stop him, or should a practice recording mistakenly wind up in 
the wrong hands and become somebody else’s hit or soundtrack, the profound sense of 
loss reflects something that is not fungible or merely economic.  The finished work 
represents the effective capture of an elusive part of oneself; its re-capture by others—
sometimes permitted and unpermitted—may feel incalculable.   This supports on non-
economic grounds the policy of granting injunctive relief in most intellectual property 
infringement actions.  The notion of irreparable harm clearly goes beyond incalculable 
market injury.  
 342 See, e.g., Courtney Love, Artist Rights and Record Companies: A Letter to Fellow 
Recording Artists, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC, supra note 264, at 307, 
available at http://www.gerryhemingway.com/piracy2.html.  Vocalist Love makes three 
points.  First, the group interests of recording artists have never been represented; the two 
unions that represent some artists for some issues—American Federation of Television 
and Radio Artists (“AFTRA”) for vocalists and AFM for non-singers and session 
musicians—split the interests. Id. at 307–08.  Second, recording artists’ health care and 
pension needs are unprotected. Id.  Third, recording artists are not paid what they’re 
worth—i.e., they receive an inequitable share of the economic value they create. See id. 
at 307–10.  Many die broke.  But see Danny Goldberg, The Ballad of the Mid-Level 
Artist, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC, supra note 264, at 81, 83 (“Up until 
the 1970s, record companies unquestionably hoarded a disproportionate share of the 
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to organize343 and, most importantly, to jettison the traditional 
routes to a musical career in favor of efficient, decentralized digital 
independence and audience exchange. 
However, the foregoing is foundation to the analysis that 
follows in which I argue that recognition of the musical author’s 
personality interest may support the status quo against proposed 
copyright law reform proposals.  Why?  Because digital 
technology increasingly destroys the prevailing assumptions about 
the nature of rights, power and infringement. 
IV. INDEPENDENT AUTHORS AMID INDUSTRY CHANGES AND 
PROPOSED LEGAL REFORMS 
With digital technology, virtually everything that facilitated the 
music business as I have described it has changed.  The 
relationships on which musical authors were dependent for the 
production, marketing, and distribution of their “product” are no 
longer essential for reaching consumers.344  At the height of record 
industry profits in 1999, the estimated cost of producing a typical 
pop album could easily exceed $100,000;345 now, most musicians 
can purchase the capability to record and press their own tracks for 
the cost of a home computer and less than $150 in additional 
software and hardware.346  Equally important, the advent of 
Apple’s iTunes and a few other music download sites that resolved 
a decade of litigation over free music file-sharing over the Internet 
has facilitated inexpensive means by which even little-known 
artists can market their work to an interested public.347  Numerous 
 
profits, and many artists, especially black artists, didn’t get paid at all.  Over the last 
several decades, however, as the business grew, a class of lawyers emerged to take 
advantage of the record companies’ needs for marketable product, and the deals 
themselves have vastly improved for the artists.”). 
 343 But see Norman Kelley, Blacked Out: Hip-Hop and R&B Artists MIA in Music 
Industry Struggle, VILLAGE VOICE, June 11, 2002, at 47 (describing the apparent apathy 
among many big hip-hop artists for organized resistance to record label exploitation). 
 344 See Ku, supra note 6, at 306. 
 345 See David J. Moser, MP3 Doesn’t Spell the End of Traditional Labels, BILLBOARD, 
Aug. 7, 1999, at 4. 
 346 Ku, supra note 6, at 306. 
 347 See, e.g., New Service Brings iTunes to Indie Artists, SPIN, Jan. 19, 2006, 
http://www.spin.com/articles/new-service-brings-itunes-indie-artists. 
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companies such as Amazon.com provide low-cost distribution of 
an artist’s physical CD, though scholars like Larry Lessig believe 
that digital distribution portends a day when music itself is not 
generally owned by consumers but rented when and as needed 
through the use of downloads to portable devices.348  For record 
companies, many suspect that these developments may mean the 
end of business under the existing model of commodification (they 
“cannot compete with free”).349  Indeed, they cite the steady 
decline in industry revenues, which in 1999 were $14.5 billion, but 
by 2007 had dropped to just $10.3 billion.350  For artists, it is as if 
technology has birthed a potentially pure system, a state of creative 
nature where, like live performances on a festival of stages, 
delivery of one’s work to a curious audience is unimpeded by 
costly intermediaries.351  For consumers, music through the 
Internet has promised to become a digital commons. 
A. Developments: Three Thefts Upon Artists 
These changes occurred amid a rapid succession of discrete 
developments.  I will broadly describe them here as three different 
kinds of thefts upon the artist, although even from an artist 
perspective there is considerable disagreement about that.  The 
three are artist-to-artist appropriation through “sampling” and 
audio collage, consumer-to-artist appropriation through 
unauthorized peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing, and the diminished 
scope of the artist’s interest as a result of industry conglomeration.  
Though the last is a continuation of trends underway for decades, 
the first two were made possible by the wide availability of new, 
inexpensive digital technology. 
First, artist-to-artist appropriation was elevated beyond the 
borrowing of conventions and asserted as an art form in its own 
 
 348 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 297–98 (2004), available 
at http://www.free-culture.cc/freeculture.pdf. 
 349 But see id. at 302 (citing the examples of cable television and bottled water). 
 350 RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., 2007 YEAR-END SHIPMENT STATISTICS 1 (2008), 
http://76.74.24.142/81128FFD-028F-282E-1CE5-FDBF16A46388.pdf. 
 351 TODD LARSON, COMMUNICAST: DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY-PROGRAMMED 
WEBCASTING SERVICE 4 (2003), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu 
/files/2004-01.pdf. 
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right.352  By the mid-1980s digital sampling, the practice of using 
excerpts of a recorded track in loops or other forms, became so 
inexpensive with digital technology and so commonplace in hip-
hop (specifically rap music),353 that it provoked considerable 
infringement litigation.354  While the issue of sampling is 
interesting from the perspective of intertextuality and artistic 
appropriation355—this time mainly of black artists by other black 
artists—it is the technology that is most relevant to this analysis.  
Sampling signaled the looming threat to established recording 
industry interests of cheap and accessible digital devices that 
radically diminished production costs.356  The record labels 
 
 352 See, e.g., NEGATIVLAND, FAIR USE: THE STORY OF THE LETTER U AND THE NUMERAL 
2, at 21 (1995) (detailing the art of audiocollage and the group’s unsuccessful litigation 
with established record labels and music publishers). 
 353 MCLEOD, supra note 37, at 82.  
 354 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (sampling by 2 
Live Crew of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman”); Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. 
Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993) (sampling by C+C Music Factory of Boyd Jarvis’s “The 
Music’s Got Me”); Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. 
Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (sampling by Biz Markie of Gilbert O’Sullivan’s “Alone 
Again (Naturally)”).  The natural defense in almost every one of these cases is fair use. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  For a more fulsome analysis of digital sampling and 
copyright litigation, see David M. Morrison, Bridgeport Redux: Digital Sampling and 
Audience Recoding, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 75 (2009). 
 355 I decline to join the debate over the ethics of music sampling or its status as an 
independent art form in this Article.  However, it is worth noting that pure positions are 
impossible in art forms where intertextuality—essentially, cultural sharing—is so 
commonplace in the creative process.  Artists who borrow through sampling sometimes 
justify their work on grounds of inspiration, common traditions or praise, while others 
call it unimaginative stealing.  What makes the existence of the debate so interesting from 
the perspective of this Article is that it emerges as perhaps the first public debate about 
intra-racial appropriation by black artists of other black artists (often from different 
generations).  For more discussion of the odd inconsistencies provoked by the debate, see 
Eric Shimanoff, The Odd Couple: Postmodern Culture and Copyright Law, 11 MEDIA L. 
& POL’Y (FALL) 12, 23–29  (2002). 
 356 Kembrew McLeod provides a fascinating discussion of the economics of sampling. 
See MCLEOD, supra note 37, at 77–99.  As the business grew, two changes ushered in 
more attention to copyrights.  The technological change in production costs was brought 
about by the drop in the price of digital samplers, id. at 82, and the creation (at the behest 
of big record labels) of lawyer and other service providers who would scan the market for 
unauthorized sampling. Id. at 89.  What the first made easier the other would diminish 
through higher costs.  Clearance fees for sampling increased dramatically and severely 
altered the extent to which hip-hop producers utilized sampling. Id. at 91–93.  While the 
first of two kinds of licensing fees, publishing licenses, were not typically prohibitive, the 
mechanical or master recording licenses could run as high as a flat fee of $100,000 or a 
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responded vigorously and, at least where fair use concerns did not 
predominate, with great initial success.357  The public and many 
commentators, however, began increasingly to point to the 
homespun creativity of ordinary people and their digital remixes as 
evidence of a more democratic notion of originality.358  The 
recording industry’s reaction led to such a complicated and costly 
licensing process for the sampling of copyrighted works that a 
practice that once threatened to transform popular music has 
mostly receded.359 
Second, and almost simultaneously, the Internet became a 
source for the popular distribution by consumers of copyrighted 
works for free—i.e., consumer-to-artist appropriation.  Centralized 
and decentralized file-sharing attracted enormous consumer 
interest and downloading.360  The public’s capture of free music 
was greatly assisted by the rapid development of small, efficient, 
 
percentage of royalties. Id. at 91–92.  As a result, many hip-hop acts license the 
publishing rights, rent live musicians to record the part, then sample that. Id. at 92–93.  
 357 See Lucille M. Ponte, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Digital Sampling 
Infringement Cases Are Exposing Weaknesses in Traditional Copyright Law and the 
Need for Statutory Reform, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 541–45 (2006) (surveying cases); see 
also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 399 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(describing how the district court judge was in the process of handling 800 cases, likely 
severed from an aggregate complaint, involving sampling). 
 358 See, e.g., DAVID KUSEK & GERD LEONHARD, THE FUTURE OF MUSIC: MANIFESTO FOR 
THE DIGITAL MUSIC REVOLUTION 50 (Susan G. Lindsay ed., 2005) (arguing that musical 
creation is a fluid process of building upon prior works and incapable of ownership); 
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 117–21 (2001) (discussing blues 
influences); Lawrence Lessig, Symposium, W(h)ither the Middleman: The Role and 
Future of Intermediaries in the Information Age, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 33, 37–38 
(describing the broader concept of “remix” as having “extraordinary democratic 
potential—changing the freedom to speak by changing the power to speak, making it 
different.  Not just broadcast democracy, but increasingly a bottom-up democracy.  Not 
just the New York Times democracy, but blog democracy.  Not just the few speaking to 
the many, but increasingly peer-to-peer.”). 
 359 See MCLEOD, supra note 37, at 91–93 (illustrating the prohibitive costs of sampling 
and the shift to live musicians instead).  
 360 MARK LAFFERTY, DIST. COMPUTING INDUS. ASS’N, FTC PUBLIC COMMENT: PEER-TO-
PEER FILE-SHARING TECHNOLOGY: CONSUMER PROTECTION AND COMPETITION ISSUES 1 
(2004), available at http://ftc.gov/os/comments/p2pfileshare/OL-100012.pdf (pointing 
out that P2P file-sharing programs have been downloaded 700 million times, eclipsing 
Instant Messaging applications). 
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and inexpensive MP3 players, such as Apple’s iPod,361 which 
enabled users to download shared music from their computers but 
listen to them anywhere—as a generation before them had done 
with Sony Walkmen and their own music collections or shared 
mixed tapes.362  However, the Napster,363 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,364 and related “piracy” litigations 
demonstrated the weight of corporate copyright owners (the major 
record labels and film studios) to protect their profits from 
unauthorized and unpaid use.365 
Finally, industry conglomeration among record companies 
altered the expectations between signed artist and labels, in many 
cases making it harder for artists to develop unless they were 
assured great success early in their contracts.366  The record labels 
grew larger and commanded greater market share, having enjoyed 
some of their most profitable years just prior to the dissemination 
of popular technology that would threaten to supplant them.367  
Rather than make serious attempts at acknowledging and 
embracing the technology and the cultural preferences it suddenly 
liberated, the major labels fought to maintain as much of the brick-
and-mortar economic infrastructure as they could.368  This was 
reflected in the music piracy litigations.  It was reflected in the 
industry’s success in persuading Congress to grant recordings a 
 
 361 See, e.g., 100 Million iPods Sold (Apr. 9, 2007), http://www.apple.com/pr/ 
library/2007/04/09ipod.html (announcing the sale of the one hundred millionth iPod in 
2007). 
 362 See, e.g., Tom Hormby, The Story Behind the Sony Walkman (Sept. 15, 2006), 
http://lowendmac.com/orchard/06/sony-walkman-origin.html. 
 363 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 364 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 365 See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE 
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 110–28 (2004). 
 366 See, e.g., infra Part IV.B. 
 367 See, e.g., Not So Fast, Freeloader (July 7, 2007), http://www.lambgoat.com/features/ 
articles/metal-hardcore-downloading.aspx (“Century Media’s [record label] Vallee 
echoes a similar stance, commenting, ‘We really excelled and had our most profitable 
years in 2002–2003.  As downloading stuff became more prominent, we saw our sales 
decrease more and more each year.  Now we’re at the point where we realize, how are we 
going to combat this?’” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 368 See id. 
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limited public performance right against digital broadcasting.369  
Yet it was further reflected in the increased frustration that many 
recording artists have with onerous, longstanding industry 
practices.370  Even megastar artists such as Prince, Michael 
Jackson, and George Michael engaged in very public disputes over 
contract terms with their labels;371 most recently, the band 
Radiohead experimented with releasing an album itself over the 
Internet and allowing fans to pay what they wished for it.372  
Smaller artists, especially newer ones, have opted to forego the 
terms, overhead, and whims of record companies and produce 
themselves over the Internet.373  By the early 2000s there were 
only five major record labels left.374  The consolidation of so much 
cultural property into the hands of a few multinational interests 
finally saw its greatest backlash in music sales, which have 
significantly declined.375  We turn now to what this may all mean 
for the interest of music authors in the context of music copyright 
reform proposals over the Internet.  The next section sets forth the 
experience of increasingly independent singer-songwriters—
specifically, an actual recording artist named Citizen Cope.  The 
 
 369 The Digital Performing Rights in Sound Recording Act (“DPRA”) was enacted in 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336, followed by the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (“DMCA”) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860. See also FISHER, supra 
note 365, at 93, 102–10. 
 370 See, e.g., Pay the Band, http://paytheband.blogspot.com/2008/10/zoolights-hogle-
zoos-annual-musicians.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2009), for an example of a blog 
devoted to advancing the notion of compensating musicians and exposing common 
practices by which they are not. 
 371 See Norman Kelley, The Politics of Smoke & Mirrors: Music Revolution or a King 
on the Loose?  Keepin’ It Real, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BLACK MUSIC, supra note 
264, at 293, 296–98. 
 372 Jon Pareles, Radiohead, Big Enough to Act Like a Baby Band, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 
2007, at E1. 
 373 As David Byrne has predicted: “[W]hat we now call a record label could be replaced 
by a small company that funnels income and invoices from the various entities and keeps 
the accounts in order.” David Byrne, David Byrne’s Survival Strategies for Emerging 
Artists—and Megastars, WIRED, Dec. 18, 2007, http://www.wired.com/entertainment/ 
music/magazine/16-01/ff_byrne/?currentPage=all. 
 374 They were AOL Time Warner, Vivendi/Universal, Bertelsman Music Group 
(“BMG”), EMI Distribution, and Sony Music. Roberts, supra note 318, at 34–35 (listing 
the individual artists therein). 
 375 See Mark Pytlik, Remix/remodel, MUSIC ADVERTISING, Nov. 1, 2004, at 31. 
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final section analyzes that experience against some of those salient 
ideas about copyright reform. 
B. Independence and the Contemporary Singer-Songwriter, 
Citizen Cope 
Clarence Greenwood—whose stage name is Citizen Cope—is 
an independent singer-songwriter, preparing to release his fourth 
LP/CD in 2010.376  His career exemplifies many of the more recent 
developments in recorded music, including dissatisfaction with 
major labels and music publishers, dependence on performance for 
revenues, a strong inclination to own and control his own 
copyrights and finally a decision to become independent.377  He 
recorded his first album with Dreamworks in 2002378 and his 
second and third with RCA Records in 2004 and 2006,379 
respectively.  Like most recording artists, he has seen a steady 
increase in the proportion of his music sold on-line relative to hard 
album/CD sales.380  Although his voice, lyrics and overall sound is 
such a mixture of elements as to be racially ambiguous, Citizen 
Cope is white.381 
Early on Cope decided to start his own publishing company for 
his songs after concluding that his publisher was more like “a 
collection agency” and did nothing to promote licensing 
opportunities.382  This dissatisfaction mirrored his experience with 
record labels, whose services such as A&R, publicity and radio or 
press contacts were not as important to his success.383  Citizen 
Cope is successful in that he has made enough money to be a full-
time touring and recording musician, but his soulful, danceable yet 
 
 376 The following account of Citizen Cope’s views on his music and the music industry 
were expressed in an interview with the author. Telephone Interview with Clarence 
Greenwood, Citizen Cope (May 21, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Greenwood 
Interview].  Citizen Cope may be reached through his website: www.CitizenCope.com. 
 377 Id. 
 378 Citizen Cope, Press, http://www.citizencope.com/press/3-Music_:_ (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2009). 
 379 Id. 
 380 Id. 
 381 See id. 
 382 Greenwood Interview, supra note 376. 
 383 Id. 
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thoughtful sound is a closer fit to the amorphous “indie” category 
than pop.384  He benefited early on from his relationship with 
record companies,385 but now believes that he cannot afford to give 
up control and compensation for his work to interests that are now 
more “about being bought out and getting market share, signing 
acts.”386  In his view, the majors are no longer patient or as skilled 
in supporting artists, but “scared and understaffed.”387  Rather than 
being artist-driven, he says, conglomeration made it “executive-
driven.”388 
In deciding to become independent, Citizen Cope has 
concluded that he must be both artist and businessperson.389  
“Intellectual property is the most powerful thing that America 
has,” he explains.390  This is a matter of financial well-being and 
more.  “People want different things at different times in their 
lives.”391  Cope describes elements of ownership that parallel a 
personality interest in music authorship: recognition, message, 
control, choice and interaction with his audience.  “To take your 
music where you want it to go, you have to have some control over 
those copyrights.”392 
However, a large concern looms over his future: What if the 
free downloads he, like many others, offer listeners become the 
distribution norm, and his personal investments in recording his 
work go “unrecouped”?393  Worse, what if consumer-to-artist 
 
 384 Id. 
 385 Id. 
 386 Id. 
 387 Id. 
 388 Id. 
 389 Id. 
 390 Id. 
 391 Id. 
 392 Id. 
 393 For a sample of a contemporary artist views on music downloads, see Jeffrey P. 
Fisher, The Lowdown on Downloads, ELECTRONIC MUSICIAN, Dec. 1, 2006, at 76, 
available at http://emusician.com/mag/emusic_lowdown_downloads; Marc Hopkins, 
Digital Rhythms: Embracing Online Music Distribution, JAZZTIMES, Oct. 2007, available 
at http://www.jazztimes.com/articles/19109-digital-rhythms-embracing-online-music-
distribution; Jonathan Perry, For Musicians, an Online Alternative, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 
1, 2006, at F1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/living/articles/2006/ 
03/01/for_musicians_an_online_alternative; Interview by Chris Burnett with George 
Kahn, Pianist and Composer, in Culver City, CA (Mar. 7, 2003), available at 
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appropriation transcends the idea of infringement in the public’s 
mind, and independent artists cannot survive?394  That is, he must 
worry not only that he will not gain the sales he requires as an 
investor, but that he will lose control, message and the ability to 
express himself as an artist should his audience become 
parasitic.395 
This account of Citizen Cope provides a profile not of all 
musical authors today, but of many, including the types for whom 
music copyright protection was originally intended—trained 
performing composers.  In order to exploit his works’ present and 
future value and to enforce their use against unauthorized takings, 
Citizen Cope would benefit greatly from the status quo in 
copyright law, with one major caveat.  As he struggles to figure out 
the precise form of his independence, he will undoubtedly need to 
hire intermediaries on a part-time basis to help him get his CD out.  
These will include his lawyer, marketing help, CD manufacturing, 
distribution capacity, some publicity assistance and, very 
importantly, computer expertise for managing his web presence 
and sales.  Composer and artist David Byrne described and 
evaluated a series of paths music artists can currently take in 
digital music.396  Citizen Cope will ultimately choose some 
combination of these based on his particular strengths and 
inclinations.  However, this freedom of choice is a result of recent 
changes that continue to shape the life of music artists.397  It 
 
http://www.musicdish.com/mag/print.php3?id=7358; Posting of dorcquek to The Web 
Difference, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/webdifference/2008/02/12/class-6-liveblog-in-
conversation-with-brad-turcotte (Feb. 12, 2008, 15:26 EST); Zed Shaw, Can a Musician 
Sell Their Music Online? (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.zedshaw.com/blog/2009-02-26-
2.html. 
 394 Greenwood Interview, supra note 376. 
 395 As Citizen Cope himself put it rather humorously, “If I do a show in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma to 17,000 people and they all know the words to the song, I don’t know if they 
all bought the single.” Id. 
 396 See Byrne, supra note 373 (describing, inter alia, the “licensing deal,” the 
“manufacturing and distribution deal,” and the “self-distribution deal”). 
 397 For a somewhat different view of what the average musician wants, see KUSEK & 
LEONHARD, supra note 358, at 52–53, who write: 
Big Music has it backwards: people make music because they are 
emotionally and creatively driven to do so . . . not because they are 
looking at potential profits or to protect some rights they may have. . . 
.  If an artist has a message, if someone is really moved by him or 
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reflects more than the desire to be paid fairly for one’s creative 
works; it also recognizes that independence (or a certain amount of 
entrepreneurism) is the best available means to protect one’s 
personality interests in selfhood.  Therefore, at a practical level, as 
long as artists like Citizen Cope are not contractually beholden to 
intermediaries that own the work they author or/and perform, and 
as long as they have access to the wherewithal to do a modicum of 
self-production, the legal status quo may satisfy their primary 
career goals as artists.  At a theoretical level, they are in a position 
to enjoy the originally intended benefits of copyright law in 
fulfilling both their utilitarian and personality interests. 
This conclusion presents a paradox in which we might end 
where we began with copyright law.  My analysis is not as 
thorough or as knowledgeable as the reformers I will summarize 
next, but we will analyze the thrust of their proposals against 
Citizen Cope’s statements and the re-assertion of the status quo.  
The normative issue might be phrased as follows: Is the musician’s 
interest better served by any of the following copyright reform 
proposals, or have we reached the optimal environment for 
musicians now that most may soon replace corporate “authors”? 
C. Reform Proposals 
Several important assumptions underlie the digital copyright 
reform proposals.  First, most assume that the public interest—in 
the primary shape of the consumer interest—is paramount.398  
Second, they assume that composers and artists deserve fair 
compensation.399  Third, record labels and other large 
intermediaries probably deserve their precarious fate.400  Most 
seem to assume that musicians have not and will not in the future 
 
her, if something really unique happens when the artist performs, and 
if that performance touches people’s lives, it will have rewards for the 
artist. 
 398 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Free(ing) Culture for Remix, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 961, 
965. 
 399 See Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 960 
(2007) (“It is time for lawmakers to conceive of copyright law not as a means of granting 
property rights, but as a means of using property rights to promote fair competition in the 
marketplace of expression.”). 
 400 See, e.g., MCLEOD, supra note 37, at 246. 
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earn a majority of their income from the exploitation of 
copyrighted works, but rather from performing or promoting one’s 
fame or both.401  The economic incentives argument, though 
central to the construction of copyright, is therefore never a serious 
challenge because it is rarely a significant factor.402  Finally, they 
all assume that consumer downloads can be effectively captured 
for tracking and compensation purposes beyond attempts to evade 
detection.403  The proposals then divide broadly into those that 
radically alter or overhaul current copyright rules and those that 
modify yet complement existing law. 
1. Those That Radically Alter/Overhaul Current Copyright 
Rules 
Raymond Ku sees little continued need for music copyright 
law on the Internet because the public now internalizes the costs of 
distribution through the purchase and use of music download 
devices, and artists generally find compensation in other ways, 
such as merchandising and performance.404  Instead, he proposes a 
“Digital Recording Act.”405  In lieu of copyright, the act would 
fund musicians and songwriters through statutory levies on 
consumer equipment such as computers and audio electronics.406  
Funds could be allocated based upon the popularity of works by 
monitoring downloads and other indicia of a musician’s popularity 
on the Internet.407 
 
 401 See Ku, supra note 6, at 309–10 (“As George Lucas demonstrated to the motion 
picture industry, for the artist, these secondary markets can be more lucrative than the 
right to reproduce and distribute content.”). 
 402 See id. 
 403 See, e.g., id. at 314 (“[B]illboard.com maintains listings of the top downloads at 
various websites.  Napster, AOL, and other networks could build similar tracking systems 
of their own.  By tracking what music is being listened to, the funds from the statutory 
levy could be disbursed based upon consumer preference, whether defined by the 
percentage of downloads, number of downloads, percentage of use, or any number of 
formulas.”). 
 404 See id. at 300. 
 405 Id. at 269. 
 406 See id. at 312–15. 
 407 See id.  Neil Netanel has made similar proposals where the levy would be on the sale 
of any product or service whose value is enhanced by P2P file-sharing. See Neil W. 
Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 53–55 (2003).  Canada, France and Germany already impose a 
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William Fisher’s proposed changes would also effect a drastic 
overhaul of existing rights under copyright law by devising a 
system of works registered with the Copyright Office for 
payment.408  These works would receive a unique filename by 
which their digital transmissions could be tracked for frequency of 
use.409  Copyright registrants would be paid a share of taxes levied 
by the government proportional to their relative popularity;410 this 
division would follow the principle of “consumer sovereignty.”411  
Music and films would thereafter be free, and most restrictions on 
reproduction, adaptation, distribution, and performance would be 
eliminated.412  According to Fisher, 
the new system would leave in place the current 
legal standards for determining who is the author of 
a creative work—just as it would the current system 
of contracts and customs by which “authors” 
compensate other people and organizations who 
participate in the creation or marketing of 
entertainment products.413 
Proponents of these types of proposals point out the not 
insignificant social benefit of dramatically reducing the costs of 
copyright enforcement.414 
From Citizen Cope’s point of view, there is nothing 
particularly objectionable about plans from which he can expect to 
be paid, assuming tracking and capture is possible.  These 
proposals establish efficient mechanisms for compensation that 
relieve him of the administrative costs.  They may amount to a 
 
version of such levies. See generally Jeremy F. deBeer, The Role of Levies in Canada’s 
Digital Music Marketplace, 4 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 153 (2005); P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, 
LUCIE GUIBAULT & SJOERD VAN GEFFEN, INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW, THE FUTURE 
OF LEVIES IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT (2003), http://www.ivir.nl/ 
publications/other/DRM&levies-report.pdf (examining existing levy systems in the 
European Union). 
 408 FISHER, supra note 365, at 202. 
 409 Id. 
 410 Id. 
 411 Id. at 223. 
 412 See id. at 202. 
 413 Id. at 204–05. 
 414 See, e.g., id. at 246. 
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greater financial reward than the current system, possibly less.  We 
just cannot know.  The administrative problem may be greater than 
stated.  Even after Napster and its progeny, there exist a plethora of 
means for the public to receive free, unauthorized music 
downloads, including traditional file server-based sharing, internet-
relay-client (“IRC”),415 Usenet,416 P2P file-sharing417 and 
BitTorrent.418  This is Cope’s looming fear of digital 
independence.419  Once consumers figure out how to go around the 
system of capture, his share of financial rewards shrinks.  Further, 
if copyright rights are substantially reduced, as Ku suggests, Cope 
is without the chief legal means to prevent other kinds of 
appropriations of his work.420  That loss of enforcement control 
 
 415 Internet-relay-client (“IRC”) is a server-based chatroom system developed in the 
mid-1980s. See ICRC Help Archive, http://irchelp.org/irchelp/altircfaq.html (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2009).  It requires the download of a client to access a server, such server 
containing several chatrooms that an individual can enter. Id.  Connections to servers, as 
well as entry to chatrooms, may often require password authentication. Id.  Upon entry to 
a chatroom, automated listings are posted in the chatroom identifying file downloads. 
See, e.g., Efnet IRC Network, http://efnet.us (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
 416 Usenet is a decentralized group of servers across the world that mirror newsgroup 
postings on their individual servers. See mIRC, http://www.mirc.com (last visited Oct. 
21, 2009). 
 417 Peer-to-peer file-sharing is a phrase encompassing several different methods of file-
sharing. See Wikipedia, Peer-to-Peer, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peer-to-peer (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2009).  Although the method has evolved considerably since its initial 
development in the mid-1990s, the essential structure remains the same: (1) a client 
indexes all available files on a user’s computer according to file name and other metatag 
information; (2) the client connects to a centralized server; (3) and the server receives the 
user’s list of files and indexes them accordingly. See id.  Thereafter, a connected user 
may use the client to search the central server for files, which can be downloaded from 
some other user. Id.  Newer variants, such as Direct Connect, eliminate the user 
registration step, and the only information exposed (other than a user’s files), is an IP 
address, which is generally retained by the central server. See Wikipedia, Direct Connect 
(File-Sharing), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Connect_(file_sharing) (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2009). 
 418 BitTorrent is a decentralized file-distribution method in which participating users 
send and receive small bits of a file from each other. See BitTorrent, http://www. 
bittorrent.com/btusers/help (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).  Torrents involve two 
fundamental concepts—swarming and tracking.  A swarm is simply a group of users who 
wish to receive and send a certain file. Id.  What BitTorrent provides is a method by 
which such users are matched up (i.e., tracking). See, e.g., Isohunt, http://www.isohunt. 
com (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
 419 See Greenwood Interview, supra note 376. 
 420 See Ku, supra note 6, at 322–23. 
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may become a loss of creative control and distinct harm to his 
personality interests as an author.  From an authorial perspective, 
that may seem like too high a price to pay. 
2. Those That Complement or Modify the Current Copyright 
Rules 
With the goal of greater P2P “shareability” and an interest in 
paying composers and musicians directly, Jessica Litman proposes 
a licensing system for file-sharing that is both statutory and 
voluntary.421  Statutory in that “the copyright law would prescribe 
the terms and conditions of the license;”422 voluntary in that “the 
law would provide an opportunity to designate works as ineligible 
for the blanket license.”423  Critical to the proposal is an opt-out 
provision, which imposes a heavy burden on authors who wish to 
remain outside the blanket license.424  Thus, paid and free music, 
old copyright and new, would exist side by side in a royalty system 
administered by a government agency.425 
Finally, Larry Lessig has argued persistently for a number of 
significant changes to the current rules while retaining much of the 
existing structure.426  Like Litman, he would mark files to 
distinguish whether they are free or not.427  Lessig would also 
increase the formal requirements for copyright ownership in order 
to make it more burdensome, including registration and renewal, 
though he would streamline these requirements by co-opting 
private registrars.428  As to the duration of copyright ownership, 
Lessig would return it to the pre-1976 average term of 32.2 years, 
with an even shorter period for derivative rights.429  Additionally, 
Lessig offers a host of changes aimed specifically at the different 
kinds of file-sharing uses.  For instance, Lessig would provide 
 
 421 Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 41 (2004). 
 422 Id. 
 423 Id. 
 424 See id. at 45. 
 425 See id. 
 426 See LESSIG, supra note 348, at 287 (outlining the five types of changes Lessig would 
make to the existing structure). 
 427 See id. at 290–91. 
 428 Id. at 288–89. 
 429 See id. at 292–93. 
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blanket immunity to file-sharing of non-copyrighted works and 
those as to which the copyright owner plainly endorses.430  As to 
file-sharing of content that remains under copyright, but is not 
readily available without undue burden, Lessig would disclaim 
liability for non-commercial users and impose a flat fee on 
commercial users.431  Finally, as to those using file-sharing 
services as substitutes for CD purchases, Lessig would impose a 
tax, similar in effect to Fisher’s proposal, to compensate artists to 
the extent they can establish harm from file-sharing.432 
From Cope’s vantage point, plans that complement existing 
law are probably more attractive than those that overhaul it.  They 
are certainly more likely to overcome the political jockeying that 
accompanies reform, though Litman herself is doubtful that major 
reform is likely soon.433  She also acknowledges that the problem 
with P2P, for all its excitement, is that creators are not being 
adequately paid from it.434  In order to avoid that, plans like hers 
would rely on the same administrative build-ins for creator 
confidence that the earlier proposals hope to institutionalize.435  In 
that regard, it suffers from similar assumptions about effective 
tracking and capture. 
Ironically, the de facto presumption of “shareability” is less 
obvious in Lessig’s proposal, which makes it more author-friendly 
(in a beneficial sense if, again, we assume the diminishing role of 
the record labels).  In particular, Lessig’s proposal trains the 
primary interest slightly more on the public domain than on the 
consumer (free file-sharing) interest.436  Shorter terms, more 
formalities, limited derivative rights all enhance the public domain 
(an artist-friendly interest as well) without sacrificing robust rights 
for current copyright holders who can manage the details.  Indeed, 
the tax on file-sharing’s market substituting effects speaks directly 
 
 430 Id. at 303. 
 431 See id. 
 432 Id. 
 433 Litman, supra note 421, at 38. 
 434 Id. at 31. 
 435 See id. at 38; see also Ku, supra note 6, at 310. 
 436 See LESSIG, supra note 348, at 296 (“The aim of copyright, with respect to content in 
general and music in particular, is to create the incentives for music to be composed, 
performed, and, most importantly, spread.”). 
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to the economic anxieties artists may see underlying the other 
proposals.437 
Yet none of the extant proposals directly addresses the musical 
author’s personality interest, which requires utilitarian reward (the 
economic interest) and long-term protections for control of 
message, form of expression and freedom from distortion—
especially as technological change continues to alter the music 
landscape.  Regimes that primarily ensure artist compensation on 
the way to flexible consumer use may miss that.  They risk being 
little more than what Professor Long calls “cash ‘n carry” 
schemes.438  At a very practical level, the failure to adequately 
marry the economic with the personality is reflected in the terms 
and agency of a license.  If the artist controls permission over 
either the public’s use or another artist’s use of her music, she is 
exercising some semblance of ownership over her authorship.439  If 
authorship is governed instead by blanket or compulsory licenses 
(or worse, no license at all after initial usage fees have been paid), 
control is lacking and personality is probably at risk.440  Even post 
hoc control in the form of moral rights is lacking from the reform 
proposals, which again exposes dignity and author identity to risks.  
Citizen Cope may rather not wonder what his music is being used 
for in the world—even if he can expect some payment for it.  The 
interest in social exchange about which many reform proponents 
write could also be advanced by the transaction costs associated 
with seeking out an artist’s permission. 
I had not expected to reach this conclusion at the outset of this 
project, but the evidence of systematic exploitation and 
appropriation of music authorship fairly compels it from an artist’s 
perspective.  Of course, that perspective is not the only relevant 
interest in music copyright law, merely the one most often 
subordinated.  There are also many legitimate concerns about 
 
 437 See id. 
 438 See Long, supra note 59, at 1163–64. 
 439 Professor Long discusses the close, personal relationship an artist has to his/her 
work.  Long argues that the lack of authorial control can lead to a disincentive to create 
new works. See id. at 1192–93. 
 440 See id. at 1193 (“Given the personal nature of many creative acts, any diminution in 
authorial control must be carefully circumscribed and must include recognition of the 
personality rights of the artist to assure that creation is not discouraged.”). 
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overprotection at the expense of the public domain.  Some of these 
may be answered by the condition precedent I assume—that artist 
authorship independent of record label ownership will soon be the 
norm—but not entirely.  The proposal to both limit the duration 
and scope of prohibited derivative uses goes far in curbing the 
excesses of cultural proprietorship.441  A greater judicial 
commitment to expanding fair uses would be another important 
step in this direction.  But if we take seriously the natural rights 
aspects of copyright’s origins, then we should be willing to 
acknowledge the continuing importance of artists’ personality 
interests in their work and to protect them from being dismissed by 
exclusively economic priorities. 
CONCLUSION 
The status quo could be made even better by a more explicit 
marriage of justificatory interests, personality and utility, as I have 
argued.  The historical analysis of American music and black 
musicians in particular demonstrates that the distributors’ interest 
has benefited much more from an economic justification for 
copyright protection than actual authors.  That is not an argument 
against the copyright owner’s economic interest, but rather a 
general suspicion of ownership by non-authors.  Author and 
performer-only musicians were systematically denied the financial 
rewards for their work (before and after the 1976 Act) by the 
measure of the growth of industry intermediaries who in effect 
employed them.442  The most basic tenets of natural law are 
frustrated by a legal regime that facilitated so much theft, adhesion 
bargaining, and exploitation by necessary but often predatory 
intermediaries.  I have argued, therefore, that the economic 
calculus must be reformulated—as it can be through digital 
 
 441 See LESSIG, supra note 348, at 295 (specifically advocating for such changes as part 
of his overall reform proposal); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Unbundling Value in 
Electronic Information Products: Intellectual Property Protection for Machine Readable 
Interfaces, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 415, 480–86 (1994) (“[D]isaggregation 
encourages the preparation of a wide variety of compilations or derivative works which, 
by definition, include new value, by diminishing the scope of the original author’s 
protection.”). 
 442 See, e.g., supra note 305 and accompanying text. 
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music—and the utilitarian interest re-examined to focus again on 
its nominal intended beneficiary: the author. 
To do so the personality interest must be elevated.  This is 
particularly true for aesthetic works, such as music, fiction, and 
visual art, where the investment in Hegelian will and personality is 
clearly manifest.  Recognition today may be somewhat different 
than the Hegelian definition, but it is no less important.  The 
current brick-and-mortar (or “lawyers-and-limos”)443 system made 
little provision for injury to personality, and therefore its defense 
has been minimal and ineffectual.  However, from the artist’s 
perspective, it is knowable by its often painful absence, which I 
have referred to generally as appropriative harms.  Illustrated by a 
long and difficult history for black musical authors before and after 
the 1976 Act, these harms negatively define the personality 
interest.  However, the prospects for greater artist independence 
through the production and distribution of digital music suggest a 
return to copyright’s early author emphasis and an affirmative 
definition of her interests in personality.  Given that promise, we 
must be extremely cautious about limiting those protections just 
when they may do the most good. 
 
 
 443 See supra Part I.B. 
